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Hybrid wage-and-hour class actions, which combine a Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA ') opt-in collective action and a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure Rule 23 opt-out class action in a single civil action,
demonstrate the unusual interplay of opt-in and opt-out rules. The hybrid
class action, and its viability as a mechanism for wage law enforcement,
raises fundamental questions as to who participates in lawsuits, how we
should hold employers accountable for wage-and-hour noncompliance, and
the role of the federal courts in enforcing public rights. An opt-in rule
tends to produce low participation rates, while an opt-out rule tends to
produce high participation rates. This means that employers are typically
confronted by a larger number of state claims in the Rule 23 class action
than federal claims in the FLSA action. The substantive consequences of
dual certification, along with related jurisdictional and policy issues, have
created division within the federal courts regarding whether FLSA opt-in
collective actions and Rule 23 opt-out class actions may consistently
coexist. While wage laws have historically been undermined by persistent
underenforcement, the hybrid class action has the potential to expand
enforcement. This Article examines the relevance of the FLSA opt-in action
and its opt-in rates to Rule 23 class certification and federal jurisdiction for
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state wage claims. This Article engages in critical evaluation of the
reasons for low FLSA opt-in rates by providing a comprehensive collection
of empirical data on opt-in rates, analyzing reasons for low opt-in rates,
and articulating the implications for wage law enforcement. This Article
argues that FLSA section 216(b) and Rule 23 are consistent procedural
enforcement mechanisms, and advances approaches to Rule 23 class
certification and federal jurisdiction that integrate an understanding of low
opt-in rates. Ultimately, this Article proposes that dual certification of
FLSA collective actions and Rule 23 class actions is an appropriate
response to the unusual interplay of opt-in and opt-out rules in hybrid class
actions.
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WAGE LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
I.
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the United States, workers are routinely denied their rights
to a minimum wage and overtime pay. The widespread business practice of
wage-and-hour violations victimizes the most vulnerable workers in the
low-wage economy1 and increasingly affects employees in moderate-
income positions.2 Noncompliance takes many forms: employers simply
pay less than the minimum wage, fail to permit or to pay for meal or rest
breaks,3 fail to pay for walking-time or donning and doffing activities,4
mandate 'off-the-clock' work without pay,5 or misclassify workers as
independent contractors or as employees that are exempt from wage-and-
hour protections.6 These practices indicate a continuum of noncompliant
behaviors by employers that range from denying workers are covered under
the employment laws, as in the case of misclassification, to outright
defiance of the law as when an employer intentionally pays less than the
1. The federal government's definition of "working poor" refers to a person that spends twenty-
seven weeks in the labor force but whose income falls below the poverty-line. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, US. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, A PROFILE OF THE WORKING POOR, 2003 1 (2005). Low-
wage workers, however, are a broader social group that include persons that work and live in poverty by
all accounts, notwithstanding that they may live above the government's poverty-line. See Sharon M.
Dietrich, When Working Isn't Enough: Low-Wage Workers Struggle to Survive, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 613, 614 n.4 (2004). Low-wage workers are disproportionately black or Latino, current or former
welfare recipients, undocumented workers, or engage in "contingent" work (the non-traditional jobs
performed by day laborers, temporary employees, or independent contractors). Id. at 614-19.
2. Wage-and-hour violations in the garment, grocery, restaurant, construction, manufacturing,
agricultural, janitorial, domestic work, taxi and auto services, and many other industries have been well-
documented. See, e.g., ANNETTE BERNHARDT, SIOBHAN MCGRATH & JAMES DEFILIPPiS, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, UNREGULATED WORK IN THE GLOBAL CITY: EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
VIOLATIONS IN NEW YORK CITY 1 (2007), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/ d6a52a30063
b2d6399tm6bgaq4.pdf; NAT'L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, HOLDING THE WAGE FLOOR:
ENFORCEMENT OF WAGE AND HOUR STANDARDS FOR LoW-WAGE WORKERS IN AN ERA OF
GOVERNMENT INACTION AND EMPLOYER UNACCOUNTABILITY (October 2006), available at
http://nelp.3cdn.net/95b39fc0a12a8d8a34_iwm6bhbv2.pdf; SIOBHAN McGRATH, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, A SURVEY OF LITERATURE ESTIMATING THE PREVALENCE OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
VIOLATIONS IN THE U.S. (2005), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/bdeabea099b758la26 srm6
r9zf.pdf.
3. Steven Greenhouse, In-House Audit Says Wal-Mart Violated Labor Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
13, 2003, at A16 ("The audit of one week's time-clock records for roughly 25,000 [Wal-Mart]
employees... found 60,767 apparent instances of workers not taking breaks, and 15,705 apparent
instances of employees working through meal times.").
4. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 36 (2005).
5. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings, Law in the Labor Movement's Challenge to Wal-Mart: A Case
Study of the Inglewood Site Fight, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1927, 1946-47 (2007) (noting a lawsuit against Wal-
Mart regarding "off-the-clock" work).
6. See generally NAT'L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, 1099'D: MISCLASSIFICATION OF
EMPLOYEES AS "INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS" (2005), available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/69b8tb
3896de8fe734_vjm6bn9kl.pdf.
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minimum wage or refuses to compensate employees for overtime.7
Worker protection requires both adequate labor standards and rigorous
enforcement. Stagnant for nearly ten years, the federal minimum wage of
$5.15 per hour was widely recognized as an inadequate wage floor that
failed to provide working people with the basic income necessary to
achieve a decent standard of living or to rise out of poverty. In 2007,
Congress finally enacted an increase of the minimum wage from $5.15 to
$7.25, to occur in three phases over two years.' Without strict wage law
enforcement, the benefits of this belated but welcome minimum wage
increase will be undermined by noncompliance with wage-and-hour laws.
Historically, the wage-and-hour protections of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and similar state laws have been limited by persistent
underenforcement.9 When the costs outweigh the benefits, workers are less
likely to enforce their rights. Workers are discouraged from litigating their
claims by fear of retaliation, the inaccessibility of the legal system, and the
significant effort and expenses required to recover a frequently small unpaid
wage.'0 Accordingly, private enforcement, in the form of individual
lawsuits, is an insufficient vehicle for challenging wage-and-hour
violations. Public enforcement, suffering from a lack of budgetary
resources and political will, has also failed to reduce the gap between
violations and claims. "
Significantly, the sheer breadth of wage-and-hour noncompliance
renders wide-scale enforcement all the more daunting. Chronic
underenforcement provides incentive for employers to engage in systematic
wage-and-hour violations. Employers will choose noncompliance if the
risk of enforcement is low or if accepting the penalties is cost-effective. 2
This convergence of noncompliance and underenforcement entrenches a
culture in which lack of accountability further widens the gap between
workers' rights and the remedies for violations.
Currently, government agencies, public interest lawyers, and workers'
rights groups are utilizing several strategies to combat wage-and-hour
7. See Noah D. Zatz, Working Beyond the Reach or Grasp of Employment Law, in THE GLOVES-
OFF ECONOMY: WORKPLACE STANDARDS AT THE BOTTOM OF AMERICA'S LABOR MARKET 43-47
(Annette Bernhardt, Heather Boushey, Laura Dresser & Chris Tilly eds., 2008).
8. See Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2007); see also Stephen Labaton,
Congress Passes Increase in the Minimum Wage, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2007, at A12.
9. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation,
105 COLUM. L. REv. 319, 326-30, 361-62 (2005).
10. See David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem
of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 59, 82-84 (2005).
11. See id. at 62.
12. Id. at 61-62. The Employer Policy Foundation estimates that employers would owe workers
$19 billion annually if they complied with wage laws. See Craig Becker, A Good Job for Everyone:
Fair Labor Standards Act Must Protect Employees in Nation's Growing Service Economy, LEGAL
TIMES, Sept. 6, 2004, Vol. 27, No. 36.
WAGE LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
violations.13 This Article focuses on the emerging litigation strategy of
class action lawsuits.14 Wage-and-hour class actions are on the rise in the
federal courts. 5  Many recent wage-and hour class actions have resulted in
large damage settlements and have forced employers to remedy their
violations.16 The threat of litigation and substantial damage awards sends
the important message that violating wage-and-hour laws does not pay, and
demonstrates to employers that compliance is the best strategy to avoid
litigation and liability. The explosion in wage-and-hour filings, and the
potential that such actions will mitigate the problem of underenforcement,
13. See, e.g., Janice Fine, Workers Center: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream, 50
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 417, 419 (2006) (analyzing the role of worker centers that organize primarily
immigrant worker populations and engage in advocacy for policy reform); Peter Romer-Friedman, Note,
Eliot Spitzer Meets Mother Jones: How State Attorneys General Can Enforce State Wage and Hour
Laws, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 495, 542-53 (2006) (discussing enforcement of state wage-and-
hour laws by state attorneys general and labor departments, and proposing heightened state
enforcement); Rita J. Verga, An Advocate's Toolkit: Using Criminal "Theft of Service" Laws to Enforce
Workers' Right to be Paid, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 283, 290-96 (2005) (recommending use of state
criminal laws to hold employers that withhold wages criminally liable); Matthew T. Bodie, The
Potential for State Labor Law: The New York Greengrocer Code of Conduct, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 183, 192-95 (2003) (discussing the collective bargaining process between grocers and their
employees in New York City, and the state attorney general's involvement, which resulted in
development of a code of conduct setting basic employment rights and wage-and-hour standards);
Andrew Elmore, Comment, State Joint Employer Liability Law and Pro Se Back Wage Claims in the
Garment Industry: A Federalist Approach to a National Crisis, 49 UCLA L. REV. 395, 410-12 (2001)
(examining California's model for wage law enforcement).
14. This is not to imply that class-based litigation is a substitute for a larger movement to reform
the workplace. There has been a substantial critique of litigation as a vehicle for social change. Overall,
litigation tends to be ineffective at changing underlying social structures. See, e.g., William P. Quigley,
Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21
OHIO N.U._L._REv. 455, 468 (1995); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 341 (1991); JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 232-33 (1978). A well-intentioned
litigation strategy also can have the collateral consequence of disempowering clients or undermining
organizing efforts. See, e.g., Quigley, supra, at 468; Steve Bachmann, Lawyers, Law and Social
Change, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 31-32 (1984). Apart from political mobilization, public
education, and policy advocacy, wage-and-hour litigation will have only limited impact and indeed, may
even be counterproductive. See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant
Workers, the Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407,
438-39 (1995); GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE
LAW PRACTICE 74-78 (1992).
15. See Wage Hour Collective Actions Jumped 70 Percent Since 2000, Analysis Shows, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA), Mar. 26, 2004. Wage-and-hour class actions now exceed the number of employment
discrimination class actions in the federal courts. Wage-Hour Actions Surpassed EEO in Federal Courts
Last Year, Survey Shows, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Mar. 22, 2002, at C-I.
16. In 2006, the largest wage-and-hour settlements tended to be against large companies and
numbered in the tens of millions of dollars: Citigroup Global Markets ($98 million), UBS Financial
Services ($89 million), United Parcel Service ($87 million), IBM ($65 million), Morgan Stanley ($42.5
million), 24 Hour Fitness ($38 million), Merrill Lynch ($37 million), Siebel Systems ($27.5 million),
Sears Roebuck ($27.5 million), and Electronic Arts ($14.9 million). See SEYFARTH SHAW LLP,
ANNUAL WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION LITIGATION REPORT (2007 ed.). Other lawsuits have resulted in
more modest recovery for workers. Steven Greenhouse, Two Restaurants to Pay Workers $164,000,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2005, at B3; Ron Howell, Gristedes in $3.25 Million Deal With Workers,
NEWSDAY Dec. 18, 2003, at A03.
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suggest the need for examination of the legal and policy issues involved in
wage-and-hour class actions.
Important is an unusual "hybrid"' 7 wage-and-hour class action that
arises in these cases, one that combines an opt-in collective action under the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Rule 23 ("Rule 23") opt-out class action for state wage claims. 8 Rule 23's
opt-out rule normally applies to both federal and state statutory claims that
are concurrently filed in federal court. However, in a hybrid wage-and-hour
class action, the state law wage claims may be brought as an opt-out class
action pursuant to Rule 23, but FLSA section 216(b) permits only opt-in
collective actions for the FLSA claims.' 9 Because employees do not
usually take affirmative steps to opt in or opt out of a class lawsuit, 2' FLSA
section 216(b)'s opt-in rule tends to produce low participation rates,
whereas Rule 23's opt-out rule tends to produce high participation rates.2'
Consequently, the interplay of opt-in and opt-out rules in hybrid class
actions results in differing class sizes for the FLSA and state law claims.
Hybrid class actions, therefore, require courts to resolve the question of
dual certification, that is, whether to certify both an opt-in class for the
FLSA claims and an opt-out class for the state claims. Additionally, courts
must decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims.
Whether to grant dual certification is a procedural decision that has
substantive consequences for rights enforcement. 2 If dual certification is
granted, Rule 23's significantly higher participation rates result in a larger
number of state wage claims against an employer, as opposed to federal
claims. If not granted, a court is effectively limiting an action to the claims
of those persons who affirmatively opted into the FLSA collective action,
resulting in a considerably smaller number of wage claims against an
employer. A court's decision whether to grant dual certification implicates
the extent of liability facing employers, the scale of employee participation,
and the power of the class action as a mechanism for wage law
17. Practitioners use the term "hybrid" action to describe how a concurrently filed FLSA
collective action and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23 class action involves application of
different procedural mechanisms: the opt-in and opt-out rules. See, e.g., David Borgen, NAT'L EMP.
LAWYERS ASS'N 15TH ANNUAL CONVENTION, ADVANCED ISSUES IN LITIGATING FLSA COLLECTIVE
ACTIONS: HYBRID AND STATE LAW CLASS ACTIONS AND NEW DOL WHITE COLLAR REGULATIONS
(June 2004), http://gdblegal.com/resources.php?menultem=61 &article=28.
18. An opt-out rule presumes participation in a class lawsuit unless a person affirmatively dissents
from membership. An opt-in rule, on the other hand, requires that a person affirmatively consent to
membership in a class lawsuit.
19. Compare Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2007) with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
20. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond "It Just Ain't Worth It":
Alternative Strategies for Damage Class Action Reform, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 137, 146 (2001)
(discussing the underinclusive nature of the opt-in regime, generally).
21. See infra Part TV.
22. See Hensler & Rowe, Jr., supra note 20, at 145-47 (explaining that an opt-in rule is likely to
"screen out" many individuals that wish to participate in class litigation, and may thereby inhibit the
pursuit of legitimate claims and limit an employer's liability).
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enforcement.
Courts are divided on the question of dual certification. 23 This division
is apparent in the vast number of district court rulings on hybrid class
actions. These decisions apply Rule 23 and supplemental jurisdiction
doctrines to address concerns with low FLSA opt-in rates, the compatibility
of FLSA opt-in and Rule 23 opt-out actions, and most importantly, the
substantive effects that flow from allowing hybrid class actions to go
forward. Under Rule 23, courts have considered whether low opt-in rates
support or disfavor numerosity of the class and superiority of the class
action.24 In addressing supplemental jurisdiction, courts have considered
the significance of the typically larger ratio of state claims to FLSA claims
for class treatment of those claims.
The jurisdictional inquiry has generated two circuit court opinions, De
Asencio v. Tyson 25 and Lindsay v. Government Employees Insurance
Company,26 which reached different outcomes. De Asencio held that a
large disparity between the FLSA opt-in rate and potential opt-out class size
created a substantial predominance of state law claims over federal claims
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The court, therefore, did not exercise
supplemental jurisdiction.27  However, in Lindsay, the court found no
substantial predomination. The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction
because both the FLSA and state law actions advanced similar legal
theories and factual issues.28 The divergent approaches in De Asencio and
Lindsay are reflected in the district courts, which are also divided on the
question of supplemental jurisdiction in hybrid class actions.29
This Article explores the apparent tension between the opt-in and opt-
out systems in hybrid wage-and-hour class actions, as well as the normative
implications of low opt-in rates for hybrid class actions. A relevant
consideration in the analysis is the federal judiciary's role in ensuring that
adequate procedural mechanisms are available for enforcing employment
23. See infra Part 111.
24. Compare McLaughlin v. Liberty Mutual Ins., 224 F.R.D. 304, 308 (D. Mass. 2004); O'Brien
v. Encotech Constr. Servs. Inc., 203 F.R.D. 346, 352 (N.D. 111. 2001); Beltran-Benitez v. Sea Safari,
Ltd., 180 F. Supp. 2d 772, 774 (E.D.N.C. 2001); Kelley v. SBC, Inc., No. 97-CV-2729 CW, 1998 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 18643, at *37-38 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 1998) with Bartleson v. Winnebago Indus., 219 F.R.D.
629, 636 (N.D. Iowa 2003); Thiebes v. Wal-Mart Stores, No. 98-802-KI, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 664, at
*7-8 (D. Ore. Jan. 9, 2002). The Rule 23 standards of central concern in hybrid class actions are the
Rule 23(a) numerosity requirement and the Rule 23(b)(3) requirement that the class action be superior to
other methods of adjudication. Of course, a class also must meet other Rule 23(a) requirements of
commonality, typicality, and adequacy, and the Rule 23(b)(3) requirement of predominance, see FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(a); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), but these factors do not raise unique issues in hybrid actions and
are therefore not discussed.
25. 342 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2003).
26. 448 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
27. De Asencio, 342 F.3d at 311-12.
28. Lindsay, 448 F.3d at 424-25.
29. See infra Part III.A.2.
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laws. This Article argues that dual certification is an appropriate response
to the barriers that prevent workers from exercising their FLSA opt-in
rights. This position is clearly guided by the empirical premise that wage-
and-hour violations are a significant, broad-based social problem in the
American economy,3" and that workers often face significant costs and
obstacles that prevent them from affirmatively pursuing wage claims."
This position is further informed by the view that legal principles should
support rigorous enforcement. The ultimate conclusion in favor of dual
certification rests on the recognition that the strength of wage law
enforcement as a stimulus to workplace reform fundamentally depends on
courts' interpretations of the procedural mechanisms for enforcement.
Surprisingly, although the hybrid class action has received some
attention in legal scholarship, critical inquiry into the reasons for low opt-in
rates and the implications for wage law enforcement has been notably
absent.2 This Article provides a Table with data on low opt-in rates and
documents the effect of these rates on case outcomes. This Article indicates
that low opt-in rates give reason for pause before acceptance of an opt-in
system that could seriously undermine the enforcement potential of class
actions.
This Article further examines the policy basis for the existence of
hybrid class actions and the meaning of low opt-in rates for doctrinal
30. See supra note 2.
31. See, e.g., Weil & Pyles, supra note 10, at 82-84.
32. The hybrid wage-and-hour class action has tended to receive only passing attention.
Scholarship has concentrated on the difference between FLSA's "similarly situated" standard for
certification of a collective action and Rule 23 standards for certification of a class action, a difference
summarized infra Part II.C. See, e.g., Scott Edward Cole & Matthew R. Bainer, To Certify or Not to
Certify: A Circuit-By-Circuit Primer on the Varying Standards for Class Certification in Actions Under
the Federal Labor Standards Act, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 167 (2004); David Borgen & Laura L. Ho,
Litigation of Wage and Hour Collective Actions Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL'Y J. 129 (2003); Brian R. Gates, Note, A "Less Stringent" Standard? How to Give FLSA
Section 16(b) a Life of its Own, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1519 (2005); James M. Fraser, Comment, Opt-
in Class Actions Under FLSA, EPA, and ADEA: What Does it Mean to be "Similarly Situated"?, 38
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 95 (2004); Cf Janet M. Bowermaster, Two (Federal) Wrongs Make a (State) Right:
State Class-Action Procedures as an Alternative to the Opt-In Class-Action Provision of the ADEA, 25
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 7, 41-42 (1991). Defense lawyers wrote both of the two previous articles that
focused on hybrid class actions. Those articles, aimed at defeating class certification, did not critically
analyze the implications of low opt-in rates for maintenance of Rule 23 opt-out class actions. See
Matthew W. Lampe & E. Michael Rossman, Procedural Approaches for Countering the Dual-Filed
FLSA Collective Action and State-Law Wage Class Action, 20 LAB. LAWYER 311, 313-16 (2005); Noah
A. Finkel, State Wage-and-Hour Law Class Actions: The Real Wave of "FLSA " Litigation?, 7 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 159, 166-81 (2003). A recent article argues that FLSA section 216(b)'s opt-in rule
limits wage 1 w enforcement and proposes that Congress should amend the FLSA section 216(b) to
bring it into conformity with the opt-out rule that governs most class actions. Craig Becker & Paul
Strauss, Representing Low-Wage Workers in the Absence of a Class: The Peculiar Case of Section 16 of
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Underenforcement of Minimum Labor Standards, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 1317, 1325-47 (2008). The authors provide an insightful discussion, and there is much to
recommend removing the opt-in rule for FLSA collective actions. This Article, however, analyzes the
issues implicated in hybrid class actions based on existing law that provides an opt-in rule for FLSA
collective actions and an opt-out rule for state law class actions.
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analysis of hybrid class actions. First and foremost, the FLSA collective
action and the Rule 23 class action are consistent procedural enforcement
mechanisms as a matter of federal policy.33 Doctrinally, a court properly
exercises supplemental jurisdiction when federal and state wage claims
exhibit substantially similar issues, and should not decline jurisdiction
solely on the basis that low opt-in rates result in a larger number of state
claims before the court. 34  Finally, this Article proposes two possible
approaches to Rule 23 class certification in hybrid actions: one which
identifies Rule 23 class certification for state law rights as independent from
certification of a FLSA opt-in action for federal rights, and another which
recognizes Rule 23 as a doctrinal filter that allows courts to address the
relative merits of alternative mechanisms of enforcement, including the
FLSA's limitations on employee participation, and to determine whether
the inadequacies of other mechanisms require the maintenance of an opt-out
class action. 35
Part Il of this Article discusses the doctrinal background for hybrid
wage-and-hour class actions. Part III articulates the dispute between courts
with respect to hybrid class actions, focusing on Rule 23 certification
standards, supplemental jurisdiction, and policy concerns. Part IV provides
a Table with data on low opt-in rates. It then analyzes the reasons for low
opt-in rates and describes the implications of these rates for wage law
enforcement. Part V examines the legal and policy justifications for dual
certification in hybrid wage-and-hour class actions. Finally, the Article
concludes with a discussion of the role of hybrid class actions in advancing
wage law enforcement and, more generally, broader efforts to reform the
workplace.
II.
THE ORIGINS OF HYBRID WAGE-AND-HOUR CLASS ACTIONS
This Part introduces the substantive and procedural law relevant to
hybrid wage-and-hour class actions. First, this Part discusses the
substantive provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act and state wage-and-
hour laws. Next, it explains the history of FLSA section 216(b) and Rule
23. This Part then identifies the procedural and jurisdictional doctrines that
apply in hybrid class actions.
A. The Fair Labor Standards Act and State Wage-and-Hour Laws
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 governs wage and hour practices
throughout the country. The FLSA was designed to "aid the unprotected,
33. See infra Part V.A.
34. See infra Part V.B.
35. See infra Part V.C.
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unorganized, and lowest paid of the nation's working population; that is,
those employees who lacked sufficient bargaining power to secure for
themselves a minimum subsistence wage." 36  Specifically, the FLSA
establishes a minimum hourly wage and overtime provisions. 7
The FLSA's wage-and-hour protections apply to an "employee" as
defined under the Act.38 Although the Supreme Court has interpreted
employee status under the FLSA broadly,3 9 many workers fall outside its
protections. Some workers are exempt from coverage altogether, including
many service and agricultural workers."a For example, under an exemption
for "companionship services," the FLSA does not cover home health
aides.4' Others are exempt from overtime protection, perhaps the largest
group being "executive, administrative, or professional" workers under the
so-called "white-collar" exemption.4" Notably, FLSA protection does not
extend to independent contractors, who are not considered employees under
the statute.43
A FLSA violation makes an employer "liable to the employee or
employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their
unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional
equal amount as liquidated damages. 44  The FLSA provides for public
enforcement by the Secretary of Labor, and for private enforcement by
workers through either individual claims or collective actions. Generally,
FLSA claims have a two-year statute of limitations period, except that a
three-year statute of limitations applies when the employer commits a
"willful violation. '45
In addition to the FLSA, state wage-and-hour laws protect workers.
36. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 n.18 (1945).
37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207.
38. The Act defines an "employee" as "any individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.C. §
203(e)(1). An "employer" is "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in
relation to an employee." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
39. Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728-29 (1947).
40. The FLSA initially covered only 20% of American workers. By 1996, it covered 65% of
workers. However, more than half of agricultural and service workers remained unprotected. See
Howard Wial, Minimum-Wage Enforcement and the Low-Wage Labor Market 15-16 (MIT Task Force
on Reconstructing America's Labor Market Institutions, Working Paper No. WPI 1, 1999), available at
http://mitsloan.mit.edu/iwer/pdf/tfwial.pdf.
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (2006). Recently, in Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127
S. Ct. 2339 (2007), the Supreme Court upheld the validity of this exemption. Id. at 2349.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). It has been argued that final regulations defining the "executive,
administrative, or professional" exemptions, issued in 2004, eliminated overtime coverage for six
million workers. See Becker, supra note 12, at 54.
43. The Supreme Court has explained that courts must determine whether, as a matter of
"economic realit[y]," an individual is an employee covered by the FLSA or an independent contractor in
business for himself and exempt from coverage. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 727; see also
Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947) (describing the "economic reality test" used to
determine which workers are "employees" under the FLSA).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).
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Similar to the FLSA, state wage-and-hour laws establish minimum wage
and overtime protections, and provide for enforcement of those
protections.46 A state wage claim is often functionally identical to a federal
claim, in that it challenges the same practice of underpayment of wages, and
raises similar legal and factual questions. Nevertheless, federal and state
wage-and-hour laws differ in some important respects. The FLSA does not
preempt more protective state wage-and-hour laws,47 allowing states, for
example, to provide a higher minimum wage than is required by federal
law.48 This not only results in higher wages within those states, but
potentially greater liability when an employer violates a higher state wage
floor. Some state laws also provide a longer statute of limitations for
enforcement of workers' rights, and impose greater penalties on violating
employers than does the FLSA.49
B. FLSA Section 216(b) 's Opt-In Rule and Rule 23 "s Opt-Out Rule
Hybrid wage-and-hour class actions are the product of different
procedural rules for class treatment of federal and state wage claims: the
FLSA collective action is formed by an opt-in procedure and the Rule 23
class action is formed by an opt-out procedure. There was a time, however,
when both FLSA section 216(b) and Rule 23 provided for opt-in actions.
The FLSA and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were both enacted in 1938.
At that time, while Rule 23 provided for an opt-in action, FLSA section
216(b) was silent on procedures for participation in a collective action."
Consistent with Rule 23, courts interpreted section 216(b) as implying an
opt-in rule for FLSA actions."
In 1947, Congress amended FLSA section 216(b) by enactment of the
46. See generally WAGE AND HOUR LAWS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (George K. McGillivary
ed., BNA Books 2004).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) ("No provision of this chapter or of any order thereunder shall excuse
noncompliance with any Federal or State law .. "); see also Overnite Transp. Co. v. Tianti, 926 F.2d
220, 222 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that "every Circuit that has considered the issue has reached the same
conclusion-state overtime wage law is not preempted by... the FLSA").
48. As an indication of how far some states outpace Congress in setting minimum wage standards,
even after the increase in the federal minimum wage, ten states already mandate at or above the $7.25
which the federal minimum will reach in 2009. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, FACT SHEET, TABLE
OF STATE AND CITY MINIMUM WAGES, available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-
/d/download file_49520.pdf. Additionally, many states index the state minimum wage to rise with the
cost of living, a benefit that Congress is yet to have adopted. See id.
49. See generally WAGE AND HOUR LAWS, supra note 46.
50. See, e.g., Elizabeth K. Spahn, Resurrecting the Spurious Class: Opting-In to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act through the Fair Labor Standards Act, 71
GEO. L.J. 119, 126-28 (1982) (noting that the original version of Rule 23 provided for the "spurious"
class action, a device allowing aggregation of claims when common questions of law or fact were
involved, but binding to judgment only those individuals that consented to participate in the lawsuit);
see also G.W. Foster, Special Federal Questions: Jurisdiction, Rights, and Remedies for Group Wrongs
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 295, 324 (1975).
5 1. See Spahn, supra note 50, at 127-28; Foster, supra note 50, at 325.
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Portal-to-Portal Act.5 2 The Portal-to-Portal Act responded directly to a set
of Supreme Court decisions that expanded coverage of compensable
"work" under the FLSA.5 3  Insofar as the Supreme Court expanded
coverage to include walking-time, the Act aimed to limit employer liability
and clarify the FLSA's substantive requirements. 4 At the same time, the
Act eliminated an agency action provision that had allowed entities such as
labor unions to bring lawsuits on behalf of similarly situated employees. 5
It also explicitly incorporated the opt-in requirement for FLSA collective
actions. 56
Addition of the opt-in rule brought FLSA section 216(b) into
conformity with the Rule 23 opt-in requirement in effect at the time, and
made explicit what courts at the time had already implied from the statute.
57 Unlike the Act's limiting definition of compensable "work," the
amendment to section 216(b) does not appear to have been concerned with
limiting the possibility of extensive employer liabilities resulting from
collective actions per se. Rather, as the Supreme Court explained in
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, the opt-in provision "was for the
purpose of limiting private FLSA plaintiffs to employees who asserted
claims in their own right."58 This rationale for the Act's amendment of
section 216(b) was consistent with the prevailing opt-in rule of the day.59
52. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No 80-49, 61 Stat. 84 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 216, 251-262).
53. The Portal-to-Portal Act draws its name from the Supreme Court's decision in Tennessee
Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944), where the Court held that
compensable "work" included the time that a miner walked from the mine's entrance, known as the
"portal," to the work-site and the time returning to the "portal." The Supreme Court subsequently
extended this holding to factories in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 690-94 (1946).
54. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 84. Congress's concern appeared to be the "unexpected
liabilities" that resulted from the Supreme Court's broad definition of compensable "work." Id. at § 1(a),
61 Stat. at 84. The Act clarified that that an employer would not be liable for failure to compensate
employees' walking-time, "preliminary" or "postliminary" activities, in the absence of an express
contract or custom covering those activities. Id. at § 4, 61 Stat. at 86-87.
55. Id. Congress's concern with the agency action provision was its potential to promote a flood
of litigation by "outsiders." See, e.g., Spahn, supra note 50, at 129 n.56.
56. The 1947 amendments thus established 216(b) in its modem form: "No employee shall be a
party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such
consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
57. See Spahn, supra note 50, at 129.
58. 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989). The Court declared:
In enacting the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Congress made certain changes in [FLSA]
procedures. In part responding to excessive litigation spawned by plaintiffs lacking a personal
interest in the outcome, the representative action by plaintiffs not themselves possessing
claims was abolished, and the requirement that an employee file a written consent was added.
The relevant amendment was for the purpose of limiting private FLSA plaintiffs to employees
who asserted claims in their own right and freeing employers of the burden of representative
actions. Congress left intact the "similarly situated" language providing for collective
actions... The broad remedial goal of the statute should be enforced to the full extent of its
terms. Id.
59. See, e.g., Bowermaster, supra note 32, at 30-35 (making this argument to counter the
alternative view that the opt-in requirement was added with the express purpose of limiting employer
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In 1966, Rule 23 was amended to remove the opt-in requirement from
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 60  The 1966 amendments also
established an opt-out regime for monetary damages class actions.61
However, in a parenthetical note to the amendments, the Advisory
Committee that drafted Rule 23 noted that the amendments did not apply to
FLSA section 216(b)'s opt-in rule.62  As a result, distinct procedural
mechanisms emerged for Rule 23 opt-out class actions and FLSA section
216(b) opt-in collective actions.63 Along with Congress's enlargement of
district courts' ability to exercise supplemental jurisdiction,' 4 Rule 23's opt-
out regime and FLSA section 216(b)'s opt-in regime established the
conditions for litigation of hybrid class actions in federal court.
C. Hybrid Class Actions: The Legal Doctrines
1. Class Certification Standards
In hybrid cases, the Rule 23 requirements govern certification of state
law opt-out class actions. 65  The certification standards for FLSA claims
have been less clear. Although section 216(b) allows employees to bring
collective actions on behalf of "similarly situated" employees, the statute is
silent with respect to certification standards.66 Initially, some courts simply
liability). The legislative history is not contrary to this position. Senator Donnell, in discussing the opt-
in provision, stated that "[l]t is certainly unwholesome to allow an individual to come into court alleging
that he is suing on behalf of 10,000 persons and actually not have a solitary person behind him.,." 93
Cong. Rec. 2182 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1947). While Donnell certainly may have personally desired to
limit employer liability, see Marc Linder, Class Struggle at the Door: The Origins of the Portal-to-
Portal Act of 1947, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 53, 167-75 (1991), Donnell's remarks were consistent with the
prevailing opt-in system in place at the time.
60. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c). Accord Spahn, supra note 50, at 129-30.
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v).
62. Notes of Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendment to Rules, 28 U.S.C. app. Rule 23, at 429.
63. In 1963, the Equal Pay Act was passed as an amendment to the FLSA and thus shares its
enforcement mechanism. In 1967, Congress further incorporated Section 216(b)'s opt-in regime into the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
64. See infra Part II.B.2.
65. Rule 23(a) provides a set of class certification standards for class action lawsuits:
1) Numerosity-the class must be "so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable."
2) Commonality-"there are questions of law or fact common to the class."
3) Typicality-"the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
and defenses of the class."
4) Adequacy of representation--"the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class."
Rule 23(b)(3) contains two additional elements for certification of an opt-out class action:
"predominance" ("questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members") and "superiority" ("a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy"), FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
2008
282 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 29:2
applied Rule 23 requirements to FLSA collective actions. 67 The majority of
courts, however, have rejected that approach. 68  The FLSA's "similarly
situated" standard differs from Rule 23's standards, and addresses
certification through a two-stage, "ad hoc" approach: the conditional
certification stage and the ultimate certification stage. 69  At the conditional
certification stage, the court certifies the FLSA collective action for
purposes of providing employees with notice of the action and the
opportunity to opt into the action. 70 At the ultimate certification stage, the
court makes a final determination about whether the employees are
"similarly situated" such that their claims should proceed as a FLSA
collective action.71
2. Federal Court Jurisdiction Over State Wage-and-Hour Class Actions
In hybrid wage-and-hour cases, federal courts may have jurisdiction
over the state law claims of a Rule 23 class action based on supplemental
jurisdiction7 2 or provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
("CAFA").73
To date, jurisdictional issues in hybrid actions have primarily
concerned supplemental jurisdiction and, specifically, whether a court
should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims of a
prospective Rule 23 class action. The broad federal power of
supplemental jurisdiction partly explains the rise of hybrid wage-and-hour
class actions in federal court.7 5  Before the Judicial Improvements Act of
67. Shushan v. Univ. of Colo., 132 F.R.D. 263, 268 (D. Colo. 1990).
68. See generally Cole & Bainer, supra note 32, at 172 (collecting cases).
69. On the ad hoc approach, see, e.g., Hipp v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 252 F. 3d 1208, 1218-19
(11 th Cir. 2001); Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1213 (5th Cir. 1995). See also Cole &
Bainer, supra note 32, at 171, 182.
70. In addition to facilitating notice, the earlier conditional certification is important because
tolling of the statute of limitations in a FLSA collective action occurs when an individual opts into the
lawsuit. See Cole & Bainer, supra note 32, at 169.
71. Plaintiffs have a "fairly lenient" burden at the conditional certification stage. Many courts
grant conditional certification on the basis of plaintiffs allegations and supporting affidavits. Plaintiffs
confront stricter standards at the ultimate certification stage. See Cole & Bainer, supra note 32, at 169-
72. Some commentators maintain that Rule 23 standards are generally applied at the second, ultimate
certification stage. See id. at 172. For a set of factors used at the ultimate certification stage that are
somewhat different from Rule 23, see, e.g., Thiessen v. GE Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1103 (10th
Cir. 2001).
72. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
73. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
74. When a federal court has federal question jurisdiction, as it does over FLSA claims,
supplemental jurisdiction gives a court the authority to adjudicate "all claims that are so related to claims
in the action within [a court's] original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy .. " 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1990).
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1990); see also State Wage/Hour Class Actions: Alive and Well in
Federal Court, 2-3 (2005), available at http://www.bna.comibnabooks/ababna/annual/annual.htm.
2008 WAGE LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
1990 ("the Act"),76 federal courts had supplemental jurisdiction over
pendent claims, but not pendent parties.77 This meant that a hybrid class
action was not possible before the Act because federal courts could have
supplemental jurisdiction only over the state claims of individuals that
opted into the FLSA action. The Act's extension of supplemental
jurisdiction over pendent parties enabled district courts to exercise
jurisdiction over the state claims of individuals that do not opt into the
FLSA collective action.78 Nevertheless, district courts retain discretion
about whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 9
While many hybrid class actions will continue to raise questions of
supplemental jurisdiction, jurisdiction in hybrid class action cases will
increasingly be decided under CAFA. CAFA signified Congress's support
for greater federalization of class actions."0 Before CAFA, a federal court
lacked diversity jurisdiction unless all named plaintiffs satisfied "complete
diversity" of citizenship from defendants and the $75,000 amount in
controversy." To open the federal courts to large-scale state law class
actions, CAFA eased the rules for diversity jurisdiction, requiring only
"minimal diversity" between the parties and a five million dollar amount in
controversy for the claims of all class members. 2 The parties in many
hybrid class actions will meet the less stringent requirement of minimal
diversity, and the wage claims will often generate an amount in controversy
76. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990),
77. Pendent-claim jurisdiction was established in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715
(1966), allowing a court to hear concurrent federal and state claims when those claims derive from "a
common nucleus of operative fact," id. at 725. Initially rejected by the Court in Finley v. United States,
490 U.S. 545, 549 (1989), but later adopted by Congress in the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990), pendent-party jurisdiction allows a court to decide the state
claims of persons that do not have federal claims before the court, so long as those claims implicate
factual or legal issues similar to the federal questions before the court, see Finley, 490 U.S. at 549.
78. In other words, the power of supplemental jurisdiction now includes pendent-claim and
pendent-party jurisdiction. State Wage/Hour Class Actions: Alive and Well in Federal Court, 2-3
(2005), available at http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/ababna/annual/annual.htm; see also Denis E.
McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction Statue: A Constitutional and Statutory Analysis, 24
ARIz. ST. L.J. 849,926 (1992).
79. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a court "may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.. . if 1)
the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law; 2) the claim substantively predominates over the
claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction; 3) the district court has dismissed
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction; or 4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other
compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2007).
80. S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 5 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6 (explaining that
"interstate class actions typically involve more people, more money, and more interstate commerce
ramifications than any other type of lawsuit," and consequently, arguing that "such cases properly
belong in federal court.").
81. See Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973), superseded by statute, Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §310, 104 Stat. 5089, 5113-14 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1367), as held in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005).
82. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). Minimal diversity exists when only one plaintiff and one
defendant have diversity of citizenship. Id. CAFA also made it easier for defendants to remove class
actions that meet the jurisdictional requirements to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b).
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in excess of five million dollars. Accordingly, an increase in the number of
hybrid class actions in federal court can be expected under CAFA. 83
Nonetheless, CAFA does not mandate federal jurisdiction over all class
actions. For example, CAFA contains an exception from federal
jurisdiction if "the number of members of all proposed plaintiff classes in
the aggregate is less than 100."" Additionally, CAFA established a local
controversy exception that exempts certain cases from its jurisdictional
requirements.85 Instances will remain for courts to review state claims in
Rule 23 class actions under principles of supplemental jurisdiction.86
Jurisdictional issues in hybrid class actions will continue to be addressed
under both CAFA and supplemental jurisdiction.
III.
HYBRID WAGE-AND-HOUR CLASS ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. Hybrid Class Actions: Doctrinal and Policy Concerns
This Part turns to the substance of the current division within the
federal courts on approaches to dual certification of hybrid wage-and-hour
class actions. Essentially, courts address three underlying concerns when
faced with hybrid class actions: (1) the relevance of low FLSA opt-in rates
to Rule 23 class certification and federal jurisdiction over state law claims;
(2) the co-existence of a Rule 23 class action and a FLSA collective action
from a FLSA policy perspective; and (3) the manageability of opt-in and
opt-out actions in a single civil action.
83. The general consensus is that CAFA's expansion of federal jurisdiction over class actions will
result in a larger number of class action lawsuits being brought in or removed to the federal courts. See,
e.g., Robert H. Klonoff, Class Action Symposium: The Twentieth Anniversary of Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Shutts: Introduction to the Symposium, 74 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 487 (2006) (noting the shared view of
scholars at the conference that CAFA will lead to more class actions in federal court).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B).
85. When more than two-thirds of all plaintiffs and the primary defendants are both citizens of the
state in which suit was originally filed, it must be remanded to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B).
When between 1/3 and 2/3 of all plaintiffs and the primary defendants are both citizens of the relevant
state, a court has discretion whether to remand based on several statutory factors. 28 U.S.C. §
1332(d)(3). Jurisdiction must be denied when more than 2/3 of plaintiffs, and at least one principal
defendant, are from the relevant state. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4). See generally Stephen J. Shapiro,
Applying the Jurisdictional Provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: In Search of a Sensible
Approach, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 77 (2007); Anna Andreeva, Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The
Eight-Year Saga is Finally Over, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 385 (2005).
86. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 572 (2005) ("The CAFA ... does
not moot the significance of our interpretation of § 1367, as many proposed exercises of supplemental
jurisdiction, even in the class-action context, might not fall within the CAFA's ambit. The CAFA, then,
has no impact, one way or the other, on our interpretation of § 1367.").
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1. The Relevance of Low FLSA Opt-In Rates
Hybrid class actions are unique because of the interaction of opt-in and
opt-out rules in a single case. Courts recognize that an opt-in or opt-out
rule largely determines the scope of participation in class actions with opt-
in rates being significantly lower than opt-out rates. Courts differ, however,
in interpreting the relevance of low FLSA opt-in rates for certification of a
Rule 23 opt-out class action and jurisdiction over state law claims.
Some courts reason that a low FLSA opt-in rate implies that employees
do not want to participate in the action.87 This lack of participation is
viewed as cutting against satisfaction of the Rule 23 numerosity
requirement.88 For these courts, it makes sense to deny Rule 23 class
certification, since the alternative would bring many more workers before
the court than have expressed an interest in participation.89 Similarly, the
superiority of a Rule 23 class action is evaluated by reference to the
available FLSA opt-in mechanism.9" As workers have the option to
participate in the FLSA collective action, it is argued there is no need for a
class action including those who lack a personal stake in the outcome. 9'
Other courts draw different inferences. Although the FLSA opt-in
procedure limits membership to individuals who affirmatively consent,
"membership in [a] proposed [Rule 23] class is independent of whether the
FLSA action is joined. ' ' 92  This view suggests that low FLSA opt-in rates
87. Thiebes v. Wal-Mart Stores, No. 98-802-KI, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 664, at *7-8 (D. Or. Jan.
9, 2002).
88. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a).
89. For example, in Thiebes v. Wal-Mart Stores, where 425 of 15,000 potential class members
filed FLSA opt-in consents, the court held that Rule 23 numerosity could not be satisfied. The court in
Thiebes reasoned that a state class "would bring in many more employees than those who believe they
were actually aggrieved by Wal-Mart's alleged conduct." The court thus inferred a desire of
nonparticipation from the low opt-in rates. Thiebes, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 664, at *7-9.
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) asks whether "the class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." Id.
91. See Marquez v. Partylite Worldwide, Inc., No. 07 C 2024, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63301, at
*16 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2007) (denying employer's motion to strike the plaintiffs state law class action
allegations pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) but noting that under Rule 23(b)(3)'s
superiority requirement, Congress's "addition of the written consent requirement to the FLSA" suggests
that "an opt-out class action is not likely to be the superior method for resolving [the plaintiffs] state-
law claims that [the defendant] failed to make overtime payments"); Muecke v. A-Reliable Auto Parts
and Wreckers, Inc., No. 01 C 2361, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11917, at *6-7 (N.D. I1. June 21, 2002)
(finding that due to the availability of the FLSA opt-in mechanism, "it makes no real sense to the Court
to certify a class that will automatically include all of the employees unless they opt out"); see also De
La Fuente v. FPM Ipsen, No. 02 C 50188, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24040 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 2002).
92. McLaughlin v. Liberty Mutual Ins., 224 F.R.D. 304, 308 (D. Mass. 2004); see also O'Brien v.
Encotech Constr. Servs. Inc., 203 F.R.D. 346, 352 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (emphasizing that state wage laws are
"separate rights" enforced by procedures distinct from the FLSA opt-in system); Beltran-Benitez v. Sea
Safari, Ltd., 180 F. Supp. 2d 772, 774 (E.D.N.C. 2001) (stating that the FLSA opt-in procedure "does
not bar the application of Rule 23 to a separate [state] cause of action in the same complaint"); Kelley v.
SBC, Inc., No. 97-CV-2729 CW, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18643, at *37-38 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 1998).
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are simply irrelevant to Rule 23 class certification.9 3  Some courts,
however, have considered the lack of participation in FLSA collective
actions to support Rule 23 class certification. The FLSA opt-in procedure
is viewed as an obstacle to participation for individuals who lack
understanding of the legal system, do not speak English, or fear retaliation
by employers.94 Just as many employees are prevented from bringing
individual FLSA claims for such reasons, these obstacles to participation
indicate that employees will be unlikely to opt into a FLSA collective
action.95 Low opt-in rates thus indicate that joinder through the FLSA opt-
in regime is impracticable, a factor that supports the Rule 23 requirement of
numerosity. 96 Similarly, low opt-in rates suggest that a Rule 23 class action
is superior to the FLSA action as a mechanism for fair and efficient
adjudication of wage claims. 97
2. Hybrid Class Actions and Federal Policy
A conceptually distinct, but related, question is whether hybrid class
actions conflict with federal policy. 9t This question usually manifests itself
when courts apply principles of supplemental jurisdiction. Some courts
question the operation of a Rule 23 opt-out class action as an "end run"
93. There are courts that take this position at least with respect to numerosity, considering only
whether the potential opt-out class size is sufficiently large, see Chavez v. IBP, No. CT-01-5093-EFS,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24598 at *4-5 (D. Wash. Oct. 28, 2002) (finding numerosity on the basis of the
3900 potential class members without reference to the FLSA collective action).
94. See, e.g., Iglesias-Mendoza v. La Belle Farm, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 363, 373 (S.D.N.Y 2007);
McLaughlin, 224 F.R.D. at 308; Goldman v. RadioShack Corp., No. 2:03-CV-0032, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7611, at *24 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2003); Scott v. Aetna Servs., Inc., 210 F.R.D. 261, 266-67 (D.
Conn. 2002); Ansoumana v. Gristede's Operating Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81, 85-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
Ladegaard v. Hard Rock Concrete Cutters, Inc., No. 00 C 5755, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17832, at *13-
14 (N.D. I11. Nov. 30, 2000).
95. See, e.g., McBean v. City of New York, 228 F.R.D. 487, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Although the
assumed socioeconomic status of the proposed class members ... is likely to preclude a significant
portion of the class from burdening the courts with individual claims, this.., argues in favor of class
action treatment to protect the rights of class members unable to litigate their individual claim.");
Ansoumana, 201 F.R.D. at 85-86 ("1 also find it fair to consider that the members of this group would
not be likely to file individual suits. Their lack of adequate financial resources or access to lawyers,
their fear of reprisals (especially in relation to the immigrant status of many), the transient nature of their
work, and other similar factors suggest that individual suits as an alternative to a class action are not
practical."); see also Godfrey v. Chelan County PUD, No. CV-06-00332-JLQ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
58569, at *11 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2007); Jimenez-Orozco v. Baker Roofing Co., No. 5:05-CV-34-FL,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93860, at *14 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 21, 2007).
96. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
97. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
98. Although this subsection addresses courts' views of jurisdiction and FLSA policy apart from
the relevance of low opt-in rates, I do not want to give the impression that low opt-in rates are not also
intimately connected with the jurisdictional and policy concerns. Courts are certainly aware that
deciding not to accept state claims as a matter of policy or of jurisdiction will result in a smaller group of
litigants bringing FLSA claims due to its opt-in rule.
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around the FLSA opt-in requirement for collective actions.99
When hybrid class actions were first being filed, most courts held that
the broad federal power of supplemental jurisdiction supported bringing
state claims into those cases.1 °°  In De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,1
0 1
however, the Third Circuit reversed a district court's exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction over state wage claims. De Asencio was the first
circuit court decision pertaining to the peculiar certification and
jurisdictional issues raised by hybrid wage-and-hour class actions. The case
involved federal and state wage claims of production-line employees at a
poultry processing plant,)02 In reversing the district court, the Third Circuit
addressed the state wage claims from a FLSA policy perspective. The court
described Congress's purpose in adopting the FLSA opt-in rule as aiming to
limit FLSA litigation."0 3 The court then mistakenly stated that the "Portal-
to-Portal Act amendment changed participation in a FLSA class from 'opt-
out' to 'opt-in'.. . ."l" Before turning to the issue of supplemental
jurisdiction, the court noted that "mandating an opt-in class or an opt-out
class is a crucial policy decision," and that "Congress has selected an opt-in
class for FLSA actions." 10 5
After its review of FLSA policy, the court held that novel issues of
state law supported a rejection of supplemental jurisdiction.'°6 Moreover,
pointing to the disparity between the FLSA opt-in rate of 447 employees
and potential opt-out class of 4100 employees, 107 the Third Circuit held that
state claims predominated over FLSA claims. 1' Although the court
99. De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 307 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting the defendant's
argument that state law claims brought as a Rule 23 opt-out class action would serve as an "end run
around the Portal-to-Portal Act's clear congressional mandate in favor of collective opt-in actions," a
position ultimately adopted by the court in the opinion).
100. See, e.g., Ansoumana, 201 F.R.D. at 89-96; Beltran-Benitez v. Sea Safari, Ltd., 180 F. Supp.
2d 772, 774 (E.D.N.C. 2001); O'Brien v. Encotech Constr. Servs., Inc., 203 F,R.D. 346, 352 (N.D. I11.
2001); Kelley v. SBC, Inc., No. 97-CV-2729 CW, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18643, at *38 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
13, 1998),
101. DeAsencio,342F.3dat3ll.
102. Id. In exercising supplemental jurisdiction, the district court noted that Tyson's production
workers were mostly Spanish-speaking immigrants, and that failure to certify a class action "would, in
many cases give defendants an advantage which would be almost equivalent to closing the door of
justice to all small claimants." De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 00-CV-4294, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13038, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2002) (quoting Weeks v. Bareco, 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir.
1941)).
103. DeAsencio, 342 F.3d at 306.
104. Id. at 306. As the history discussed earlier indicated, Congress's adoption of the opt-in rule
was consistent with the Rule 23 provisions in effect at the time of the Portal-to-Portal Act. See supra
Part lI.B.
105. Id. at 311.
106. Id. at 309-10. A court may decline supplemental jurisdiction if state claims raise "a novel or
complex issue of State law." 28 U.S.C, § 1367(c)(1) (2006).
107. Id.at310.
108. De Asencio, 342 F.3d at 311. According to the 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) factors, a court is
permitted to decline supplemental jurisdiction when "the [state] claim substantively predominates over
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acknowledged that "[p]redomination under section 1367 generally goes to
the type of claim, not the number of parties involved,"10 9 the court
explained that this rule was trumped by the "end run" concern. "' The court
characterized the hybrid class action as "causing the federal tail represented
by a comparatively small number of plaintiffs to wag what is in substance a
state dog.""' While framing its reasoning in terms of jurisdiction, the court
was clearly questioning the policy of allowing a large number of state
claims into federal court through supplemental jurisdiction, where the
FLSA provided for opt-in actions that involve a smaller number of
claimants.
While De Asencio appeared to signal a shift against hybrid wage-and-
hour class actions, the D.C Circuit in Lindsay v. Government Employees
Insurance Company took a different position, reversing a district court's
denial of supplemental jurisdiction."' In unmistakable language, the D.C
Circuit rejected the "end run" concern, declaring that "while there is
unquestionably a difference-indeed, an opposite requirement between opt-
in and opt-out procedures, we doubt that a mere procedural difference can
curtail section 1367's jurisdictional sweep."" 3
The D.C. Circuit then stressed that a court's discretion to deny
supplemental jurisdiction is "circumscribed."'"' In explaining why the
district court could not find a substantial predomination of state claims, the
D.C. Circuit reasoned that "[p]redomination under section 1367(c)(2)
relates to the type of claim and here the state law claims essentially
replicate[d] the FLSA claims--they plainly do not 'predominate." '  The
D.C. Circuit declined to expressly disagree with the Third Circuit's view in
De Asencio that predomination may be predicated on the disparity between
the opt-in and opt-out classes, choosing instead to distinguish De Asencio
on its facts. Specifically, the D.C. Circuit explained that De Asencio was
inapplicable in Lindsay because there were no novel issues of state law, the
federal and state claims raised essentially the same issues, and the opt-in
rate in Lindsay, a substantial 204 out of a potential class of 228, created a
negligible disparity in class sizes between the opt-in and opt-out actions. 116
the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).
109. DeAsencio, 342 F.3d at 311.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. 448 F.3d 416, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
113. Id. at 424 (italics omitted). The D.C. Circuit, specifically mentioning De Asencio, reasoned
that the Congressional policy of opt-in procedures for FLSA actions has no bearing on supplemental
jurisdiction over state claims. Rather, the court stressed that the "broad grant of supplemental
jurisdiction" clearly demonstrates a legislative preference for parallel federal and state claims to be
adjudicated in a single civil action. Id.
114. Id. (explaining that district courts must articulate their reasons for declining supplemental
jurisdiction based on the factors provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(1-4)).
115. Id. at 425 (italics omitted).
116. Id. at 424-25,425 n.12.
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Since De Asencio, some lower courts have echoed the "end run"
concern and declined supplemental jurisdiction, basing their decisions upon
a significant disparity between membership in a FLSA opt-in collective
action as opposed to a Rule 23 opt-out class action."l7 Other district courts,
like the D.C. Circuit in Lindsay, have found that FLSA policy does not bar
Rule 23 opt-out actions, and articulated the principle that the disparity
between opt-in and opt-out class sizes is largely irrelevant to the
jurisdictional question of predomination. 1 ' At the same time, some courts
eschew jurisdictional analysis altogether, and dismiss state wage claims
within hybrid class actions on the basis that Rule 23 opt-out actions and
FLSA opt-in actions are "inherently incompatible."' 9
3. Management of Hybrid Class Actions
In addressing hybrid class actions, courts have focused primarily on the
first two concerns, rather than on case management. Nevertheless, hybrid
class actions pose the unique procedural challenge of managing two classes
that are not coextensive. The manageability concerns center on provision of
notice. Specifically, courts must be able to effectively apprise potential
members of the different opt-in and opt-out mechanisms for FLSA and Rule
23 state law actions. This poses a potential risk of confusion in provision of
class notice,1 2 as a potential class member will be informed both of the
need to express an affirmative desire to participate in the FLSA action and
that no action is required to become a member of the state law class action.
However, many courts have touted the ability of judges to control any
confusion arising from concurrent opt-in and opt-out actions through
carefully crafted notice to class members and effective management of the
litigation process. 121 When addressing dual certification, the significance of
manageability concerns has varied according to a particular court's views
117. See, e.g., Brothers v. Portage Nat'l Bank, No. 3:06-94, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24326 at *14
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2007); Aquilino v. Home Depot U.S.A., No. 04-cv-4100 (PGS), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 48554, at *7-9 (D.N.J. July 17, 2006); Evans v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., No. 3:CV-03-0438,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32104, at * 18-19 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 2006); Jackson v. City of San Antonio, 220
F.R.D. 55 (W.D. Tex. 2003).
118. See, e.g., Sjoblom v. Charter Communs., LLC, 3:07-cv-0451-bbc, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
93879, at *12 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 19, 2007) (collecting cases following Lindsay); Salazar v.
Agriprocessors, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 873, 884-85 (N.D. Iowa 2007); Baas v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.,
No. C 07-03108 JSW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65979, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2007).
119. See, e.g., Herring v. Hewitt Assocs., No. 06-267, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56189 at '5 (D.N.J.
Aug. 11, 2006); Himmelman v. Cont'l Cas. Co., No. 06-166, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56187, at *5
(D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2006). More recently, defendants have challenged hybrid class actions based on the
Rules Enabling Act, an argument that has been roundly rejected in the courts. See, e.g., Sjoblom v.
Charter Communs., LLC, 3:07-cv-0451-bbc, 2007 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 93879, at "15 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 19,
2007).
120. See, e.g., Salazar, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 885-86 (collecting cases expressing this concern).
121. See id.
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on the institutional competence of the federal judiciary and on the value of
judicial economy.
B. Hybrid Class Actions and the Politics of Division
Hybrid class actions raise the question of whether low opt-in rates are
troubling from a Rule 23 class certification perspective. They also raise the
question of whether Rule 23 class certification is troubling from a FLSA
policy perspective. Yet both courts that have rejected and certified hybrid
class actions have not sufficiently engaged the reasons for low FLSA opt-in
rates and their influence on Rule 23 decisions. Neither have they offered a
thorough analysis of the relationship between the FLSA and Rule 23. De
Asencio and Lindsay, moreover, do not explicitly identify a principle for
determining whether the number of opt-ins relative to potential opt-out
class members warrants finding a substantial predomination of claims, and
if so, under what circumstances.
A review of the case law might suggest that a neutral application of
doctrine and policy can resolve the dispute. However, the matter is not so
simple. Legal realism's critique of the myth of "discretion-free judging" is
instructive on this point.'22 In hybrid cases, as in other areas of
constitutional and statutory decisionmaking, judges are not engaged in pure
application of legal rules that inevitably require particular outcomes. A
judge's values, predispositions, and political preferences influence
outcomes. This observation is consistent with legal realism's recognition
that the law is "politics by other means." 1
23
Courts divide on the appropriateness of hybrid class actions precisely
because there are substantive consequences to acceptance or rejection of
hybrid class actions. As stated in the Introduction, a Rule 23 class action
advanced concurrently with a FLSA action means adjudication of a larger
number of wage claims and potentially greater employer liability. Allowing
a hybrid class action, as opposed to individual litigation or a FLSA action
by itself, puts a thumb on the scale in favor of more expansive enforcement.
Knowing this, courts do not approach hybrid class actions from a clean
slate: the hybrid class action is a specific iteration of the divide between
viewing the class action as vehicle for expanding rights enforcement or as a
device that oppresses defendants with excessive liability. The division over
hybrid actions is also very much a reflection of larger debates regarding the
role of the federal courts, including whether their mission should be the
122. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor's Clothes: Recognizing the Reality of
Constitutional Decisionmaking, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1071, 1077-79 (2006) (challenging the idea that
judges simply "follow the law" without making "value choices").
123. David Kairys, Legal Reasoning, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 11, 17
(David Kairys ed., 1982).
WAGE LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
narrow goal of settling private disputes between parties with a personal
stake in the outcome, or the broader one of enforcing public rights.
In the following Part, this Article seeks to engage the substantive
consequences of hybrid class actions. To do so will require a deeper
understanding of the significance of low opt-in rates and the importance of
aggregating claims for purposes of wage law enforcement. The Article then
revisits whether dual certification is appropriate.
IV.
UNDERSTANDING OPT-IN / OPT-OUT PARTICIPATION RATES
Procedural rules have substantive effects.124 This Part aims to
document the low participation rates produced by an opt-in rule, to analyze
the reasons for the low opt-in rates, and to address how low opt-in rates
impact the scope and effectiveness of wage law enforcement. The problem
of persistent underenforcement and low opt-in rates are intertwined. An
understanding of low opt-in rates suggests the need for alternative
mechanisms of wage law enforcement.
A. The Meaning of Low Opt-In Rates
1. Empirical Data on Opt-In Rates
Little empirical data has been collected that documents the existence of
low opt-in rates.'25 This may be because the vast majority of class action
lawsuits in federal court are governed by Rule 23's opt-out rule. Since the
1940s, however, FLSA collective actions have been governed by an opt-in
rule. The ADEA and Equal Pay Act, both enacted in the 1960s, also
provide for collective actions governed by FLSA's opt-in rule. So the lack
of data cannot be attributed to a lack of opt-in collective actions.
By contrast, a recent study documented a 1% opt-out rate for opt-out
class actions. 126  Considering that class action scholars and practitioners
continue to debate the value of opt-in and opt-out rules, the lack of a similar
study for opt-in rates is surprising indeed. While a systematic study is
beyond the scope of the Article, this section collects the opt-in rates for a
124. See, e.g., Hensler & Rowe, Jr., supra note 20, at 146.
125. Practitioners estimate that 15% to 30% of eligible workers opt into FLSA collective actions.
Borgen, supra note 17. A Federal Judicial Center study does contain opt-in percentages, but only for
three cases: 39%, 61%, and 73%. THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 54 (1996).
126. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action
Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1529, 1532 (2004). The Federal
Judicial Center's study also documented a 1.2% opt-out rate for 75% of its collected class action cases.
See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 125, at 52.
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number of hybrid wage-and-hour class actions.
The Table below reports collected data on opt-in rates for FLSA
collective actions and identifies the outcomes for Rule 23 state law class
actions in those cases. When available, the number of potential class
members eligible to opt-in and the opt-in rates were obtained from court
decisions. 127 Alternatively, some of the data were gathered from
practitioners.128  The holdings section provides the particular court's
decision on supplemental jurisdiction and Rule 23 class certification. For
supplemental jurisdiction, the court may have exercised supplemental
jurisdiction over all potential class members' state claims ("SJ"), over only
individuals that opted into the FLSA collective action ("SJ opt-ins only"),
or not at all ("No SJ"). When a court exercised supplemental jurisdiction
only over state claims of opt-ins and certified the state class for those
claims, the Table indicates with "Certified for opt-ins only." For Rule 23
class certification, the court certified, did not certify, or did not reach a
decision.
TABLE
CASES POTENTIAL OPT-IN HOLDING
CLASS RATE 1. Supplemental
MEMBERS Jurisdiction (SJ)
2. Certified or Not
Certified
Scott v. Aetna, Inc. 281 22/281 (7.8%) 1. SJ
2. Certified
Thiebes v. Wal-Mart Stores 15,507 425/15,507 1. SJ opt-ins only
(2.7%) 2. Certified opt-ins
only
127. Williams v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-0605-RCJ-LRL, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
62396, at *3, 11 (D. Nev. Aug. 20, 2007); Bamonte v. City of Mesa, No. CV 06-01860-PHX-NVW,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50101, at *4 (D. Ariz. July 10, 2007); Duchene v. Michael L. Cetta, Inc., No.
CV06-4576(PAC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44984, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2007); Ramirez v. RDO-
BOS Farms, LLC, No. 06-174-KI, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40633, at *1, *5 (D. Or. Jan. 23, 2007);
Lindsay v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 448 F.3d 416, 425 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Evans v. Lowe's
Home Ctrs., Inc., No. 3:CV-03-0438, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32104, at *4, *16 (M.D. Pa. May 18,
2006); Jankowski v. Castaldi, 01-cv-0164 (SJF)(KAM), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4237, at *4, *5, *27
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2006); Scholtisek v. Eldre Corp., 229 F.R.D. 381, 392, 395 (W.D.N.Y. 2005);
Goldman v. RadioShack Corp., No. 2:03-CV-0032, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2433, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
24, 2006); McLaughlin v. Liberty Mutual Ins., 224 F.R.D. 304 (D. Mass. 2004); De Asencio v. Tyson
Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2003); Jackson v. City of San Antonio, 2003 F.R.D. 55 (W.D. Tex.
2003); Hasken v. City of Louisville, 213 F.R.D. 280, 283 (W.D. Ky. 2003); Bartleson v. Winnebago
Indus., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 629 (N.D. Iowa 2003); Scott v. Aetna Servs., Inc., 210 F.R.D. 261 (D. Conn.
2002); Thiebes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98-802-KI, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 664 (D. Or. Jan. 9,
2002); Chavez v. IBP, No. CT-01-5093-EFS, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24598 (D. Wash. Oct. 28, 2002);
Ansoumana v. Gristede's Operating Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
128. Finkel, supra note 32, at 162 n.8 (providing opt-in rates for Ladegaard v. Hard Rock Concrete
Cutter, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 346 (N.D. II1. 2001) and O'Brien v. Encotech Constr. Servs. Inc., 203 F.R.D.
346, 352 (N.D. Il. 2001)); Borgen & Ho, supra note 32, at 156 (providing opt-in rate for Hogan v.
Allstate Ins. Co.).
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O'Brien v. Encotech Constr. 40 6/40(15%) 1. SJ
Servs., Inc. 2. Certified
Ladegaard v. Hard Rock 68 11/68 (16.2%) 1. SJ
Concrete Cutter, Inc. 2. Certified
De Asencio v. Tyson Foods 4100 447/4100 1. No SJ
(10.9%) 2. N/A
Ansoumana v. Gristede's 1000 350/1000 1. SJ
Operating Corp. (35%) 2. Certified
Bartleson v. Winnebago 500 21/500 (4.2%) 1. SJ opt-ins only
Indus., Inc. 2. Not certified.
Jackson v. City of San 2000 190/2000 1. No SJ
Antonio (9.5%) 2. N/A
Goldman v. RadioShack 533 168/533 1. SJ
Corp. (31.5%) 2. Certified
Chavez v. IBP, Inc. 3909 1136/3909 1. SJ
(29.1%) 2. Certified
Jankowski v. Castaldi 40 40/450 (8.9%) 1. SJ
2. Certified
McLaughlin v. Liberty Mut. 51 13/51 (25.5%) 1. SJ
Ins. 2. Certified
Hasken v. City of Louisville 1000 20/1000 (2%) 1. No SJ
2. N/A
Lindsay v. Government 228 204/228 1. SJ
Employees Ins., Co. (89.5%) 2. N/A
Scholtisek v. Eldre Corp. 140 40/140 1. SJ
(28.5%) 2. Certified
Hogan v. Allstate Ins. Co. 6500 2300/6500 N/A
(35.4%)
Ramirez v. RDO-BOS Farms, 100 26/100 (26%) 1. SJ
LLC 2. Certified
Bamonte v. City of Mesa 700 75/700 1. SJ
(10.7%) 2. Dismissed on
pleadings. Moot.
Duchene v. Michael L. Cetta, 180 60/180 1. SJ
Inc. (33.3%) 2. Certified
Williams v. Trendwest 1578 194/1578 1. No SJ
Resorts, Inc. (12.3%) 2. N/A
Evans v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., 1317 499/1317 1. No SJ
Inc. (37.9%) 2. N/A
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The average opt-in rate for the twenty-one cases analyzed in the Table
is 15.71%. 129 This data shows that an opt-in regime results in far lower
participation rates than an opt-out regime.130 The Table also demonstrates a
connection between potential class size, FLSA opt-in rates, and case
outcomes. A comparison between the calculated opt-in rates and court
holdings indicates that higher opt-in rates may support supplemental
jurisdiction over state claims and Rule 23 class certification. Courts
exercised supplemental jurisdiction and certified Rule 23 classes for all
cases in the Table with opt-in rates over 15%. Scott v. Aetna Services, Inc.
(7.8%), Jankowski v. Castaldi (8.9%), and Bamonte v. City of Mesa
(10.7%) were the only cases where the opt-in rate was less than 15%, but
the courts exercised supplemental jurisdiction. On the other hand, in
Williams v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (12.3%), De Asencio v. Tyson Foods,
Inc. (10.9%), Thiebes v. Wal-Mart (2.7%), Bartleson v. Winnebago (4.2%),
and Hasken v. City of Louisville (2%), the courts denied supplemental
jurisdiction or limited supplemental jurisdiction to individuals who opted
into the FLSA action. Of course, these observations are simply a product of
comparison of the limited number of cases included in the Table and do not
obviate the need for a systematic study of FLSA opt-in rates. Still, the
Table's data indicates that FLSA opt-in rates are low relative to opt-out
rates and seem to influence court decisions regarding concurrent Rule 23
class actions.
2. Explaining Low Opt-In Rates
The default rule-opt-in or opt-out-largely determines the scope of
participation in class lawsuits. 13' Although empirical data on low opt-in
rates has been scarce, the literature on class action practice and internet
privacy link opt-in default rules to low opt-in participation rates.'32 This
commentary, while useful, has not considered the particular relevance of an
opt-in rule for class actions lawsuits that aggregate workers' employment
129. The 15.71% figure was calculated by dividing the total number of opt-ins for the twenty-one
cases in the Table and the total number of potential class members. If the Thiebes and Lindsay cases are
removed from the calculation, that is, the two cases with the lowest and highest opt-in rates respectively,
then the average opt-in rate is 23.34%.
130. See supra text accompanying note 121.
131. A default rule is "[the] option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing." RICHARD H.
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND
HAPPINESS 83 (2008).
132. For class action scholarship, see Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic
Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71,
101 (2003); Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in
Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 554-57 (2003); Hensler & Rowe Jr.,
supra note 20, at 144-47. For intemet privacy scholarship, see Kent Walker, The Costs of Privacy, 25
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87, 116-18 (2001); Jeff Sovem, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All:
The Fight for Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1101-13 (1999).
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law claims. When articulating the reasons for low opt-in rates in FLSA
actions, it is important to understand the particular barriers that limit worker
participation.
Fundamentally, the reason for low opt-in rates is inaction. Individuals
tend to do nothing in response to class notices. On the one hand, mere
inadvertence can explain inaction, as people fail to opt into a lawsuit by
treating a class notice as junk mail.'33 Alternatively, class notices may not
reach their intended recipients due to a number of contingencies; for
example, a class member may change her address or have a common
name.134 This problem may be especially acute among low-wage workers,
who often experience high job turnover, frequent relocations, and generally
reside in impoverished areas. 35
Inaction, on the other hand, directs attention to human psychology,
individual responsibility, and choice. One group of commentators on class
actions explains that "[c]ommon sense tells us when little is known about
the consequences of joining a lawsuit, smaller numbers of individuals will
come forward than would appear later in the litigation when more is known
about the defendant's behavior and when the consequences for the
individuals are clearer."' 36  On this view, the failure to opt-in reflects
uncertainty about the value of participation. Similarly, an aversion to the
adversarial nature of the legal system or confusion over technical
information may limit the number of people willing to affirmatively
participate in a class lawsuit.137 The failure to opt into a lawsuit can also be
explained as a product of inertia, lack of interest, or a conscious decision
not to join the lawsuit. '38
We take a one-sided approach to low opt-in rates, however, if non-
133. See Muecke v. A-Reliable Auto Parts & Wreckers, Inc., No. 01 C 2361, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11917, at *7 n.2 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 2002) (identifying this possibility while hypothesizing that
most individuals simply do not respond to class notices).
134. Finkel, supra note 32, at 162; DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS:
PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 475-76 (2000). Under Rule 23, actual notice need not
reach class members; all that is required is "best notice practicable under the circumstances." See FED.
R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2); see also Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950);
Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994). The same standard is applied in connection with
FLSA opt-in notices.
135. Cf Thiebes v. Wal-Mart, No. 98-802-KI, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 664, at *3 (D. Ore. Jan 9,
2002). In Thiebes, the court noted that 3000 notices were returned as undeliverable for a potential class
of 15,507 persons. See id.
136. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 134, at 476.
137. Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 923, 936 (1998);
see also Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking
Challenges, 71 N.YU. L. REV. 74, 134 (1996) ("Many, perhaps most, of the [class] notices present
technical information in legal jargon. Our impression is that most notices are not comprehensible to the
lay reader.").
138. Cf Redish, supra note 132, at 101 (making a similar point regarding the failure to opt-out);
John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1420 (2003)
(same).
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participation is viewed simply as a matter of individual mistake, incapacity,
or preference. Several studies have found that various social circumstances
influence the ability of individuals to affirmatively exercise their rights.
For instance, one set of studies concluded that opt-in rules tend to "screen
out" low-income people of color from participation, accounting for this
effect by reference to the inadequate educational systems and dire
socioeconomic circumstances in low-income communities of color.139 It
has similarly been documented that workers' abilities to enforce labor and
employment rights are a function of the costs and benefits that accompany
exercise of those rights.14 ° This indicates the value of a holistic approach to
understanding low opt-in rates, one that does not ignore the role of
individual choice, but rather situates it within the proper institutional
context.
Workers do not pursue rights claims in a vacuum; there are risks to
participating in rights enforcement because one must decide whether to
challenge employer practices from within the employment relationship.
Due to the presumption of at-will employment, employers have substantial
discretion to fire workers who do not have contracts. 4' The decline in
union membership that once served as a counterweight to employers' broad
discretion has further weakened workers' bargaining power and has left
many workers on their own to handle complaints against employer
practices. 142 Workers are thus confronted with a reasonable fear that
exercising their rights may subject them to employer retaliation,
notwithstanding statutory prohibitions against retaliation for rights
enforcement.'43 Termination, loss of benefits, or other employer reprisals
139. When parents were asked to enroll children for standardized tests, they failed to consent in the
opt-in system. But, after failing to opt-in, the majority of parents in the study explained that they
favored their children's participation. See Phyllis Ellickson, Getting and Keeping Schools and Kids for
Evaluation Studies, J. OF COMM. PSYCH. 102 (CSAP Special Issue 1994). See also HENSLER ET AL.,
supra note 134, at 476 (discussing such studies); Hensler & Rowe Jr., supra note 20, at 146-47
(discussing the same studies).
140. See Weil & Pyles, supra note 10, at 63; Michelle Hoyman & Lamont Stallworth, Who Files
Suits and Why: An Empirical Portrait of the Litigious Worker, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 115, 115-59 (1981).
141. Other than Montana, every state follows the at-will employment rule. This rule, while subject
to exceptions such as wrongful termination laws, remains a significant indicator of the employer's
power to set the terms of the employment relationship. See Daniel J. Libenson, Leasing Human Capital:
Toward a New Foundation for Employment Termination Law, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. I11,
112-30 (2006) (discussing the history of the at-will employment rule, including defenses and critiques).
Workers mistakenly believe that they have substantial legal protections from at-will termination. See
Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining With Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal
Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 133-47 (1997).
142. The decline of unionism and its causes has been widely discussed. See, e.g., Stephen F.
Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millenium: A Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43
B.C. L. REV. 351, 361-77, 394 (2002). Union decline and underenforcement may go hand in hand.
Workers are more likely to enforce rights when they have the support of the knowledge, resources, and
organizing capacity of a third-party intermediary. See Weil & Pyles, supra note 10, at 86-91.
143. See, e.g., Steven G. Zieff, Advanced Issues in Collective Actions, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y
J. 435, 437 (2006). This is a rational fear in a FLSA action since employers are more easily able to
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raise the costs of participation in legal action, especially when those
consequences threaten a worker's livelihood and family security.1" The
fear that by taking action one may lose their job, suffer other adverse
treatment, or hurt their reputation in the workplace, is a powerful incentive
for inertia. 145
Poverty and immigration status compound the barriers to participation.
Low-wage workers not only fear reprisal for taking action, but also face the
challenge of obtaining legal representation. Even if low-wage employees
are brave enough to opt into a collective action, lawyers are less likely to
seek back-pay for workers who were receiving very low wages to begin
with. "46 Undocumented workers fear that participation in wage law
enforcement will reveal their immigration status and lead to deportation. 147
Language and educational barriers further limit the ability of members of
these groups to understand class notices, access the legal system, and
participate in enforcement.'48
The risk of employer reprisal, the obstacles to understanding notice,
and other concerns discussed above raise serious doubt that lack of interest
or individual choice account for the failure to opt into a collective action.
Whatever one's view of these explanations, however, there is widespread
agreement that an opt-in regime results in fewer workers advancing wage
claims than under an opt-out regime. Whether this outcome is considered
problematic depends in part on the normative perspective used to evaluate
low opt-in rates. The tendency of an opt-in regime to limit workers' claims
creates a collective action problem with far-reaching consequences for the
remedial goals of wage law enforcement. The next section examines the
implications of low opt-in rates from the normative perspective of wage law
enforcement.
identify employees that opt into an action as a result of discovery. See Borgen & Ho, supra note 32, at
151-53.
144. See, e.g., Bowermaster, supra note 32, at 29 n.145 (suggesting former employees are more
likely to opt into FLSA actions since they no longer fear reprisal).
145. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 131, at 33-34 (explaining generally that "loss aversion"
encourages people to do nothing if they think it will prevent the loss).
146. Dietrich, supra note 1, at 623-24; Befort, supra note 142, at 394.
147. See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1064-66 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing the "chilling
effect" of discovery on undocumented workers' ability to pursue claims against their employers due to a
fear of having their immigration status revealed); Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d
191, 192-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying defendant's request to discover plaintiff's immigration status due
to the "danger of intimidation, the danger of destroying the cause of action, and [the risk that discovery]
would inhibit plaintiffs from pursuing their rights"). See also Rebecca Smith & Catherine Ruckelshaus,
Solutions, Not Scapegoats: Abating Sweatshop Conditions for All Low-Wage Workers as a Centerpiece
ofImmigration Reform, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 555, 565 (2006 / 2007).
148. See, e.g., De La Cruz v. Gill Coin Farms, Inc., No. 03-CV-1133, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
44675, at *6-7 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2005) (discussing these concerns with respect to low-wage migrant
workers).
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B. The Implications of Low Opt-in Rates for Wage Law Enforcement
When workers' claims are outpaced by the number of wage-and-hour
violations, the result is a gap between violations and remedies that
undermines the central goals of wage law enforcement. Clearly, workers
should be paid for their work in accordance with the law, and employers
should be held accountable to those standards. 149 Wage-and-hour violations
not only deprive workers of earned wages, but also create unfair
competition. A violating employer obtains an illegal cost-savings
unavailable to law-abiding employers in the same industry, thereby
increasing its profits or allowing for additional investment. 15 0 Furthermore,
wage-and-hour noncompliance is a form of tax evasion, as underpayment to
employees equals underpayment to the government in taxes on employee
earnings.' 51 A violating employer also drains public resources when
expenditures are made to monitor and enforce compliance, and when
unpaid workers seek public assistance benefits. To overcome these
problems, mechanisms that maximize wage claims and thereby promote
employer compliance are necessary. Because profit-motivated employers
will commit wage-and-hour violations if violating the law is cost-
effective, 5 ' a strong collective enforcement mechanism that subjects
employers to payment of wages and penalties will be more likely to
promote compliance than will a weak enforcement mechanism that limits
employer liability.
The FLSA opt-in regime creates perverse incentives for employers'
noncompliance, because FLSA's limits to employee participation insulate
employers from more expansive liability. Where wage law enforcement
depends on maximization of valid employee complaints, ' the more
expansive Rule 23 opt-out class action provides an alternative avenue for
enforcement that maximizes adjudication of state claims. To be sure, wage-
and-hour violations are the kind of social wrong for which class action
treatment was intended. As the Supreme Court has observed:
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome
149. See Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 509-10 (1950) (identifying the FLSA's
primary purpose as the elimination of substandard labor conditions).
150. See 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (articulating FLSA's purpose by stating that substandard labor
conditions "constitutes an unfair method of competition"); U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941)
(finding that the "distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions, which competition
is injurious to ... competition").
151. See Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for
Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179, 2180 (1994). As an indication of the
scope of unpaid taxes that can result from wage-and-hour noncompliance, the Internal Revenue Service
recently ruled that FedEx owed $319 million dollars in taxes because it misclassified workers as
independent contractors rather than employees. FedEx Ordered to Pay $319 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
23, 2007, at A33.
152. See Weil & Pyles, supra note 10, at 61-62.
153. See id. at 61-62; Estlund, supra note 9, at 361-62 (arguing that underenforcement undermines
labor and employment regulations); Linder, supra note 59, at 167 (arguing the same).
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the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any
individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action
solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries
into something worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor.'
54
Wage-and-hour violations are often broadly applied to a workforce, rather
than isolated instances limited to a few employees. Such violations tend to
give rise to a "negative value" claim, which involves minimal damages on
an individual basis that are large when workers' claims are aggregated. 155
By aggregating claims, the class action device enables aggrieved employees
to obtain legal representation. Private attorneys have a greater incentive to
bring employee complaints, because the class action offers the possibility of
larger damage awards and a more efficient method of adjudication.156
This aggregation is more significant under Rule 23's opt-out system
because membership in the class is presumed unless a person affirmatively
dissents. Rule 23(b)(3)'s opt-out default mitigates some of the barriers to
participation apparent in an opt-in regime. Except for the class
representatives, the majority of workers are not required to take any action
to participate in the lawsuit. This reduces the problem of non-
responsiveness to class notice, as well as the likelihood of retaliation by
employers. The Rule 23 class action overcomes the inadequacies of the
opt-in regime by enabling greater aggregation of claims and, ultimately, by
facilitating stronger wage law enforcement and deterrence of
noncompliance. '5 7 From the perspective of wage law enforcement, the opt-
out class action is superior to the opt-in collective action.
However, the low opt-in rates observed in FLSA actions also highlight
a larger point regarding the effectiveness of class-based enforcement
mechanisms. Due to the various barriers that limit individuals' ability to
affirmatively exercise their rights, an opt-in or opt-out default rule is
determinative of who participates in class-based lawsuits, the scope of
potential employer liability, and the capacity of class actions to advance
rights enforcement. The opt-in rule places the onus on individuals to come
forward to affirmatively exercise their rights, leaving them out of a class-
based lawsuit when barriers prevent their participation. Conversely, the
opt-out rule represents a choice to vindicate individual claims through a
154. Amchem Prods., Inc. v Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (1997)).
155. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 431-32 (2000) (discussing the rationale for
"negative value class actions" where the class action overcomes the transaction costs of individually
prosecuting small claims).
156. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972) ("Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides for class actions that may enhance the efficacy of private actions by
permitting citizens to combine their limited resources to achieve a more powerful litigation posture.").
157. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Class Actions, in I NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND LAW 257 (Peter Newman ed. 1998) (describing enforcement and deterrence as the goals of class
actions).
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procedural mechanism that does not allow participation barriers to prevent
rights enforcement. From the perspective of rights enforcement, a default
opt-out rule is preferable to an opt-in rule because the greater aggregation of
claims deters wrongdoing and advances accountability.
Nevertheless, not all view the opt-in mechanism in a critical light. For
employers, the opt-in mechanism minimizes potential liability since
participation rates are lower than those in opt-out actions. The opt-in
mechanism reduces potential damage awards, and makes it less likely that
profit-motivated lawyers will bring strike suits that seek to force a
settlement. 158 At the same time, while requiring an act of consent, the opt-
in regime would not prevent large-scale actions subjecting an employer to
liability when significant groups of workers step forward to address a
wrong. 1
5 9
Some also consider an opt-in rule to show respect for personal choice.
An opt-out system binds individuals to any judgment unless they exercise
their opt-out rights. The opt-in regime is preferable, it is argued, because
only individuals that affirmatively opt into an action are bound by any
judgment. On this view, the opt-in rule is preferred for its protection of
personal autonomy; it is a more democratic system than the opt-out
mechanism. 6 0
Workers' rights advocates and organizations also might find some
benefit to the opt-in mechanism, as it has potential to advance employee
voice. The opt-in mechanism has a close relationship to collective
bargaining, in its requirement that workers agree to be represented. 6' This
parallelism to collective bargaining suggests that, despite its lack of
enforcement potential, the opt-in regime is consistent with efforts to
organize workers for non-legal collective action and worker empowerment.
For those concerned with promoting worker empowerment, the opt-in rule
has some affinity with the organizing strategies that are preferred to lawyer-
driven initiatives. Workers may be more inclined to organize, and thus less
reliant on litigation, if collective action is limited to opt-in participation.
The opt-out class action, however, cannot be abandoned without
severely weakening the scope and effectiveness of statutory enforcement.
In the context of wage law enforcement, the opt-in system effectively
accepts an underenforcement regime, creating a higher risk that employers
are not held accountable for, and will, in fact, benefit from, their violations.
It is precisely because the opt-out class action confronts employers with
158. See, e.g., Hensler & Rowe, Jr., supra note 20, at 145-46.
159. See id.
160. Redish, supra note 132, at 101.
161. See Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 1945) (in describing a FLSA action
and stating that "employees, if they wish, can join in their litigation so that no one of them need stand
alone in doing something likely to incur the displeasure of an employer. It brings something of the
strength of collective bargaining to a collective lawsuit.").
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greater potential liability that it has the deterrent capacity to promote
compliance.6 Furthermore, because many individuals do not have the
incentive or ability to assert their rights through an opt-in regime,'63 it is a
reasonable policy choice to bind them to a judgment until they affirmatively
express dissent. The opt-out system still preserves the value of personal
choice as participation is not mandatory. Finally, even if the mode of
participation does not follow the model of collective bargaining, the opt-out
class action may actually offer a stronger position for workers to organize,
bargain, and campaign for reform of the workplace, by expanding wage law
enforcement. 164
That the opt-out class action may be preferable from the perspective of
wage law enforcement, however, does not resolve whether hybrid class
actions are an appropriate mechanism for redressing violations. Having
articulated the causes of low opt-in rates and the implications of these low
rates for wage law enforcement, I return to the ultimate question of whether
hybrid class actions are an appropriate procedural mechanism for bringing
wage claims in the federal courts.
V.
RETHINKING HYBRID CLASS ACTIONS
A. FLSA Collective Actions and Rule 23 State Law Class Actions are
Consistent Procedural Enforcement Mechanisms
The history and purposes of FLSA section 216(b)'s opt-in rule and
Rule 23's opt-out rule have been a central consideration in court decisions
regarding hybrid class actions. Courts have not been uniform in their
interpretation: some have found that FLSA section 216(b) does not bar a
distinct Rule 23 class action, while others have found that Congress's intent
would be undermined by allowing an opt-out class action in conjunction
with a FLSA opt-in action. Upon review, however, it is clear that FLSA
section 216(b) and Rule 23 are consistent procedural mechanisms that
enforce separate substantive rights, and that there is nothing inherently
improper about the existence of the hybrid wage-and-hour class action.
Congress appears to have intended for FLSA section 216(b) to be
consistent with Rule 23 class actions. 165  As discussed earlier, when the
162. Further, Rule 23 certification standards and judicial management of class actions operate to
limit class treatment to appropriately defined groups of workers that share common issues of law and
fact.
163. See supra Part IV.A.2. Additionally, Rule 23 contains safeguards that accommodate these
concerns, including requirements of notice and the opt-out opportunity itself FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
164. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 442; see also Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor
Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 2685, 2687 (2008) (exploring the capacity of employment law enforcement
to "facilitate[] [workers'] organizational and collective activity").
165. See supra Part II.A.
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Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 added an opt-in requirement for FLSA actions,
opt-in consents were the prevailing norm for Rule 23 class actions. At that
time, Rule 23 had an opt-in requirement, and courts had already interpreted
sec'ion 216(b) as an opt-in procedure, consistent with Rule 23.166 In 1966,
when Rule 23 was amended to provide for opt-out class actions, Congress
established a federal policy favoring opt-out class actions, aiming to enable
the litigation of small-claims and promote judicial economy.'67 While the
1966 amendments created a disjunction between section 216(b) and Rule 23
procedures, Congress has never expressly declared any inconsistency
between concurrent FLSA opt-in and Rule 23 opt-out actions. If anything,
Rule 23 was designed to address the problem of low opt-in rates by
providing for opt-out class actions. 168
It is a fallacy to reject hybrid class actions by finding some
"fundamental, irreconcilable difference" between FLSA opt-in and Rule 23
opt-out actions. 169  This mistaken logic involves a leap from the
unremarkable observation that Congress selected an opt-in rule for FLSA
actions and an opt-out rule for most other class actions to the conclusion
that Congress must also have intended to preclude dual certification. There
is no indication that Congress intended to preclude dual certification, and if
Congress wanted to do so it certainly may speak clearly to the matter. 7 '
Notwithstanding the procedural anomaly of simultaneous opt-in and opt-out
actions, the current structure of the FLSA and Rule 23 provide an opt-in
mechanism for federal wage claims and an opt-out mechanism for state
wage claims. The appropriate response to a party that seeks dual
certification is to address class formation for the FLSA claims and state
wage claims under their respective procedural rules. '
This approach is not only the correct interpretation of federal law, but
is further supported by principles of federalism, which recognize the "dual
sovereignty" of the federal government and states.' 72 One of the bedrock
federalist principles is respect for state experimentation with policy,
including the right to develop measures that address social problems in a
166. See Bowermaster, supra note 32, at 29-35.
167. 5 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (4th ed. 2002).
168. See id. at § 16:15 (quoting the Rules Advisory Committee, which in criticizing an opt-in
requirement, stated, "[Riequiring the individuals affirmatively to request inclusion in the lawsuit would
result in freezing out the claims of people-especially small claims held by small people ... ").
169. See LaChapelle v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1975) (identifying Rule 23 and
section 16(b) as "irreconcilable" procedures).
170. See Kem ex rel. Estate of Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2004) ("If
anything, the language of the FLSA suggests that, should Congress seek to authorize certification of 'opt
in' classes, it can do so with unambiguous language.").
171. See, e.g., Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1096 n.12 (11th Cir. 1996) ("[I]t is clear
that the requirements for pursuing a § 216(b) class action are independent of, and unrelated to, the
requirements for class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.").
172. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-19 (1997); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455,
458-60 (1990).
WAGE LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
more aggressive manner than the federal government.173 State wage laws
are an example of federalism at work, as states have often adopted wage
laws that are more protective than federal wage laws.'74 Within the
federalist system, just as states are obligated to enforce federal law,'7 5
federal courts are regularly called upon to enforce state laws. It is
consistent with federalist principles, therefore, that federal courts adjudicate
state wage claims through Rule 23 opt-out actions.
There may remain lingering doubts regarding the presence of larger
numbers of state claims in an opt-out action over federal claims in a FLSA
opt-in action. This is the "end run" concern addressed earlier. Although
several court decisions have been motivated by the end-run concern, it is a
seriously flawed view of federal policy. Such a view ignores the powerful
policy considerations that led to adoption of an opt-out rule for state law
class actions in the first place. Rule 23's opt-out rule was a reaction to the
inadequacies of an opt-in enforcement mechanism. Pejoratively calling
Rule 23 opt-out class actions an "end run" ignores that current rules permit
Rule 23 class actions to operate in this manner, allowing hybrid class
actions as a device for wage law enforcement. Choosing an opt-in or opt-
out rule is a "crucial policy decision" indeed,'76 and Congress has settled on
an opt-in rule for FLSA claims and an opt-out rule for state claims.
Courts should implement the federal policy favoring opt-out class
actions, notwithstanding the presence of a concurrently filed opt-in action.
The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated to district courts that departure from
the Federal Rules should not occur on the basis of perceived policy
considerations.'77  Different courts may recognize substantial policy
considerations that support either a prohibition on hybrid class actions, a
complete return to an opt-in rule, or the streamlining of current rules to
require that all class actions be formed through an opt-out rule. But it is not
the role of the judiciary to impose these policy changes by judicial
interpretation; amendment of the relevant procedural rules is required.'78 A
court cannot find FLSA and Rule 23 actions incompatible unless it overtly
disregards existing procedural rules. Under those rules, opt-in and opt-out
actions for independently raised federal and state wage claims can be
173. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.").
174. See supra Part II.A.
175. See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 US. 386 (1947).
176. See De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 311 (3d Cir. 2003).
177. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
178. See id; see also Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 10 (2000) ("Whatever merits these and other
policy arguments may have, it is not the province of this Court to rewrite the statute to accommodate
them.").
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consistently advanced in a single civil action.
B. The Meaning of Low Opt-In Rates for Federal Jurisdiction
Congress has provided independent procedural mechanisms for FLSA
and state wage claims, such that the "end run" concern is an impermissible
basis to reject a hybrid class action in whole. Yet the "end run" argument
has a distinct application in the context of determining federal jurisdiction.
The simultaneous operation of opt-in and opt-out rules, along with the
barriers to affirmative participation, result in significant disparities between
the number of federal wage claims in FLSA actions and state wage claims
in Rule 23 actions. The question is whether this disparity is an appropriate
reason for a court to deny jurisdiction. This question will not arise, and low
opt-in rates will have little significance for jurisdictional purposes, when
jurisdiction is established under CAFA. 179 However, when CAFA does not
control, courts will have the discretion to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction.
This discretion will focus on the doctrine of substantial predomination,
which was discussed earlier in connection with the De Asencio and Lindsay
decisions. The concept of substantial predomination, which is codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2),' is derived from the Supreme Court's decision in
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs. 1 There, the Court stated:
[I]f it appears that the state issues substantially predominate, whether in
terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of the
comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, the state claims may be dismissed
without prejudice and left for resolution to state tribunals. There may, on
the other hand, be situations in which the state claim is so closely tied to
questions of federal policy that the argument for exercise of pendent
jurisdiction is particularly strong.... 12
In De Asencio, the Third Circuit cited this language in reasoning that a
large disparity between FLSA opt-ins and Rule 23 opt-outs signified a
''more comprehensive state action" that established substantial
predominance of state claims.183 The D.C. Circuit in Lindsay also cited
Gibbs in a footnote that distinguished De Asencio. The D.C. Circuit did not
determine whether substantial predomination under § 1367(c)(2) could
result from "'the disparity in numbers"' between opt-in and opt-out classes,
179. As discussed earlier, CAFA granted district courts original jurisdiction over class actions
when there is minimal diversity between the parties and a five million dollar amount in controversy,
subject to certain exceptions. There will be hybrid class actions where the court has original jurisdiction
over the state law claims pursued as a Rule 23 class action, and the issue of supplemental jurisdiction
will not be implicated. See supra Part II.C.2.
180. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2) (1990).
181. 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966).
182. Id. (citations omitted).
183. De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 312 (3d Cir. 2003).
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because "the two classes [we]re almost identical in size."' 184
As a practical matter, De Asencio has yet to be squarely disavowed by
another circuit court. Plaintiffs would therefore be wise to seek
maximization of the number of FLSA opt-ins as a means to argue that
supplemental jurisdiction over state claims is appropriate. '85 A higher opt-
in rate will minimize the disparity that leads some courts to find substantial
predomination. Yet the data on low opt-in rates demonstrates that the
wisdom of this advice will be impractical under many circumstances. Even
assuming that a court orders enhanced opt-in notice procedures resulting in
a better than average response to class notice, a significant disparity
between the class sizes in the opt-in and opt-out actions is to be expected.
The lack of a disparity in Lindsay was an anomaly. In addressing
substantial predomination, courts must approach the question from the
perspective of the typical inevitability of low opt-rates.
Notwithstanding that Lindsay did not present the ideal facts to
challenge the De Asencio holding, a central focus of the D.C. Circuit's
decision was the structural similarity of the FLSA and state law claims:
"Predomination under section 1367(c)(2) relates to the type of claim and
here the state law claims essentially replicate the FLSA claims-they
plainly do not predominate."' 86  The D.C. Circuit indicated that the
qualitative substance of the claims, rather than quantitative difference in the
number of state versus federal claims, is the primary consideration for
analysis of substantial predomination. 8 7  Implicit in Lindsay is a
framework for analyzing substantial predomination in hybrid class actions:
a general rule of no substantial predomination when federal and state wage
claims primarily rise and fall on the basis of similar liability issues.
This approach contrasts with De Asencio in two respects. First, De
Asencio construed predomination quantitatively in terms of the number of
state claims versus federal claims, rather than in terms of the qualitative
substance of the claims. Second, De Asencio implicated novel issues of
state law.' 88  However, De Asencio does not foreclose the approach
proposed here. If federal and state wage claims do not raise substantially
184. Lindsay v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 448 F.3d 416, 425 n.12 (questioning the principle of
quantitative predomination expressed in De Asencio).
185. See Charles Tompkins, Damages Issues in Fair Labor Standards Act Collective Action
Litigation, 10 EMP. RTs & EMP. POL'Y J. 475, 476-77 (advising that to maximize opt-in participation,
plaintiff lawyers should "(1) work with any union representing members of the putative class; (2) make
opting-in as simple as possible; (3) guard against efforts by defendant to discourage participation by
potential class members; and (4) seek additional opportunities to communicate with class members").
186. Lindsay, 448 F.3d at 425.
187. See id.
188. See De Asencio, 342 F.3d at 311 (finding that plaintiffs had to establish entitlement to unpaid
wages based on an implied contract theory and had to show that Pennsylvania wage law applied to at-
will employees that had not entered into a collective bargaining agreement, and because state courts
were yet to rule on those novel state law issues, this weighed in favor of declining supplemental
jurisdiction).
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similar issues, as was the case in De Asencio, 8 9 then perhaps the opt-in/opt-
out disparity is an appropriate secondary factor to consider in determining
substantial predomination of state claims. However, given that federal and
state claims generally raise similar legal and factual issues, the scenario in
which the disparity in number of claims becomes relevant should be
limited.
When there are substantially similar federal and state claims, the broad
power of supplemental jurisdiction supports maintaining jurisdiction over
the state claims. The qualitative focus on the nature of the claims, rather
than the number of claims, answers the "end run" concern. Although the
state claims would not otherwise be in federal court without supplemental
jurisdiction, it makes sense that the claims remain because federal and state
wage claims usually "arise from the same nucleus of operative facts, are
substantially related to each other, and naturally would be treated as one
case and controversy." 9 o A denial of supplemental jurisdiction over similar
state claims needlessly duplicates litigation in state court, thereby creating a
risk of inconsistent results and raising potential preclusion issues. 191
Furthermore, where "a federal court [addressing supplemental
jurisdiction] should consider and weigh in every case, the values of judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity[,]' ' 92 the opt-in / opt-out
disparity deserves scrutiny as a function of the impact of opt-in and opt-out
rules on participation rates. To decline supplemental jurisdiction solely on
the basis of such disparity reinforces the systemic underenforcement arising
from an opt-in regime. The proposed approach is reasonable because it
recognizes the opt-in / opt-out disparity for what it is-the product of
barriers to participation that limit membership within the opt-in regime.
C. Dual Certification
This brings us to the ultimate decision whether to certify a Rule 23 opt-
out class as part of a hybrid class action. In describing hybrid class actions
in the federal courts, I indicated that Rule 23 considerations focus on
availability of the FLSA opt-in regime and the FLSA's typically low opt-in
rates. Here, I make two proposals for approaching Rule 23 certification in
hybrid actions: one that considers the sense in which the FLSA opt-in
regime is irrelevant to Rule 23 certification and another that addresses the
sense in which it is relevant.
The first approach follows from the conclusion that FLSA section
216(b) and Rule 23 are consistent procedural enforcement mechanisms.
189. See id.
190. See, e.g., Ansoumana v. Gristede's Operating Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
191. See, e.g., Scholtisek v. Eldre Corp., 229 F.R.D. 381, 393-95 (W.D.N.Y. 2005); Ansoumana,
201 F.R.D. at 90; Ladegaard v. Hard Rock Concrete Cutters, Inc., No. 00 C 5755, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17832, at *27-28 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2000).
192. City of Chicago v. Int'l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997).
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The two procedures, while consistent, are independent of one another and
enforce separate rights. There is a difference between comparing two
procedural routes for enforcement of a single substantive claim (for
example class treatment versus a joinder action or individual lawsuit), and
comparing two different substantive claims under federal and state law that
may be enforced using distinct procedural mechanisms. Rule 23 is
primarily concerned with the former. The relevant question under Rule 23
is whether class treatment is appropriate for a particular claim, as opposed
to other non-class procedural mechanisms. The existence of a concurrent
FLSA action for federal claims appears irrelevant to whether a procedural
mechanism other than Rule 23 is appropriate for enforcement of
independent state claims. Yet, both those courts which have certified
hybrid actions and those which have rejected hybrid actions nonetheless
evaluate the appropriateness of a Rule 23 class relative to the presence of a
concurrent FLSA action.
The second approach follows from understanding low opt-in rates and
the substantive consequences of default rules for class participation. Under
this approach, Rule 23 certification remains intertwined with the FLSA
action. Rule 23 class certification standards, particularly the numerosity
and superiority requirements, provide courts with doctrinal categories to
analyze the practical constraints of participation through the FLSA's opt-in
regime. Numerosity focuses on the impracticability of joinder.'93
Superiority concerns the relative merits of alternative enforcement
mechanisms.194 Both invite courts to certify an opt-out class to remedy
barriers to participation. When an employer makes wage-and-hour
violations a common practice, it is likely that significant number of workers
will have claims. The barriers to participation, including fear of reprisal,
problems with notice, and the small size of those claims,' 95 will limit the
ability of workers to pursue claims within the FLSA opt-in regime. For
these reasons, the FLSA opt-in regime will often be an impracticable device
for workers seeking to bring their wage claims, thereby supporting
193. The numerosity inquiry has been described as "an impracticability of joinder requirement, of
which class size is an inherent consideration . I..."  ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG
ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:3 (4th. ed. 2002). Generally, "40 class members [or more] should raise a
presumption that joinder is impracticable ... on that fact alone." Id. at § 3:5. It is not unusual for courts
to investigate barriers to participation. Small claims are often raised as evidence of joinder
impracticability. Courts also may consider "judicial economy arising from avoidance of multiplicity of
actions, geographic disbursement of class members, size of individual claims, financial resources of
class members, the ability of claimants to institute individual suits, and requests for prospective
injunctive relief involving future class members." Id. at § 3:6.
194. Rule 23(b)(3) instructs courts to review the following factors when addressing superiority of
the class action: "(A) the class members' interests in individually c ntrolling the prosecution or defense
of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun
by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action." FED. R. CIv. P.
23(b)(3).
195. See supra Part IV.
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numerosity and the conclusion that the Rule 23 class action is superior to
the FLSA opt-in collective action. 196
Accordingly, a court may consider the availability of the FLSA opt-in
regime irrelevant under the first approach, or may address its adequacy
under the second approach. One approach that should be off the table is
treating the availability of the FLSA opt-in regime as itself sufficient to
warrant rejection of Rule 23 class certification. Nevertheless, Rule 23 class
certification does not inexorably follow from the general acceptance that
dual certification of FLSA and Rule 23 actions is permissible. After all,
courts have the ultimate responsibility to evaluate the propriety of class
treatment by applying Rule 23 standards.197 For example, while wage-and-
hour claims regularly implicate common questions of law and fact
appropriate for class treatment, some issues of proof may be so
individualized that a class-wide determination will not be possible.'98
However, acceptance that hybrid class actions are permissible takes us
beyond the division over questions of their viability, and focuses judicial
inquiry on certification, case management, and the substantive merits of
wage claims. The existence of common issues in federal and state wage
claims will tend to support dual certification, as will the judicial economy
of concentrating those claims in a single action. Once certified, the federal
courts have the expertise to manage hybrid class actions, including any
issues regarding notice of opt-in and opt-out rights, discovery matters, or
trial.' 99  Federal courts have numerous grants of authority to exercise
supervision and control over class action litigation.00 This authority
enables judges to ensure a clear, fair presentation of substantive issues for
jury deliberation and, when necessary, to separate individualized issues
196. The Rule 23 class additionally promotes economy and avoids the preclusion issues that may
arise from duplicative litigation in both state and federal court. For discussion of these issues, see
Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461,483-97 (2000).
197. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 n.11 (1978) (noting this
responsibility and that Rule 23(c)(1) provides "that an order involving class status may be 'altered or
amended before the decision on the merits"' and that a class certification motion is "inherently
tentative").
198. See, e.g., Maddock v. KB Homes, Inc., No. CV-06-05241 (CAS) (JTLx), 2007 WL 2221030,
at *14 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2007) (finding that individualized determinations were required to determine
whether an employer properly exempted employees from overtime pay); Westfall v. Kendle Int'l, CPU,
LLC, No. 1:05-cv-001 18, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11304, at *39 (N.D. W. Va., Apr. 30, 2007) (finding a
lack of commonality under Rule 23); see also Lewis v. Nat'l Fin. Sys., No. 06-1308 (DRH) (ARL),
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62320, at *22-23 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2007) (finding numerosity was not
established).
199. See B3rickey v. Dolencorp, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 176, 179 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[T]he complexities of
Rule 23 and FLSA hybrid actions are a challenge that the federal judiciary, and properly instructed
juries, are generally well-equipped to meet.").
200. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(c)(12) authorizes a court to adopt "special procedures for
managing potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple parties,
difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems." The parties to class action litigation, too, are
involved in the management process by development of discovery plans, see FED. R. Civ. P. 26, and a
plan for trial, see FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
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from common issues appropriate for class-wide determination. 211
Ultimately, the federal courts have the power to determine whether the
hybrid class action will realize its potential as an important vehicle for wage




It is common to distinguish the "law on the books" from "law in
action."2 2 As written, the law is an ideal, a standard to which we aspire.
That ideal cannot be realized until the law is enforced in action. In other
words, the policy of worker protection embodied in our employment laws
cannot have its intended effect unless those laws are rigorously enforced.
Hybrid class actions offer to bridge the gap in enforcement. Rule 23 opt-
out actions overcome the barriers that prevent many workers from
participation in FLSA opt-in actions. The bottom-line is that Rule 23
allows for more expansive enforcement of state wage laws, while the FLSA
continues to limit collective action to opt-in participation and fails to
adequately deter the practice of wage-and-hour violations. Through
interpretation and implementation of procedural enforcement mechanisms,
the federal courts are vitally important to the advancement of wage law
enforcement. The approaches to hybrid class actions discussed in this
Article propose that courts apply legal doctrine with an understanding of the
barriers that discourage workers from affirmatively exercising their rights.
That this approach invites courts to facilitate the adjudication of workers'
claims does not compromise judicial neutrality, but insists that courts take
on their proper institutional role of enforcing public rights.
Litigation is no substitute for a broader strategy of social change. Yet
hybrid class actions still have a role in efforts to reform the workplace.
Hybrid class actions are a strong mechanism to enforce wage laws that may
lead employers to choose compliance, rather than being compelled to do so
by the courts. Settlement discussions offer an opportunity to negotiate best
201. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.5 (2004). The judge is able to work
with the parties on the presentation of evidence, the design of special verdict forms, and proper jury
instructions. The judge further has the authority to order multiple phases of class action litigation,
thereby preserving class treatment for common issues, although other issues may require individualized
determination. For example, it is sometimes useful to bifurcate the liability and damages phases in class
actions. See id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). That said, some courts have designed methods to
calculate damages on a class-wide basis, such as adopting formulas or extrapolating from a
representative sample of employees. See, e.g., Chavez v. IBP, No. CT-01-5093-EFS, 2002 LEXIS
24598, at *11-12 (D. Wash. Oct. 28, 2002).
202. See Christine Jolls, The Role of Public Interest Legal Organizations in the Enforcement of the
Employment Laws, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 15
(Richard B. Freeman, Joni Hersch & Lawrence Mishel eds. 2005).
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practices with employers, while the threat of litigation will deter unlawful
conduct by others before the filing of any lawsuit. The mass enforcement
of workers' wage claims will address some of the significant number of
claims that legal service organizations attempt to handle,0 3 and may have
the additional benefit of attracting workers to join broader campaigns for
workplace reform.0" Hybrid class actions also provide a frame for public
education and media outreach that draws attention to the social problem of
wage-and-hour violations.
These closing remarks are only intended to indicate that recognizing
the limits of litigation is a path to realizing its ultimate potential. Hybrid
class actions offer the concrete result of expanding wage claims and
challenging employer wage-and-hour violations, but also an opportunity for
conceptions of worker solidarity to coalesce around wage law enforcement.
Wage law enforcement is not only a litigation strategy, but provides a basis
for organizing and mobilizing workers to participate in creative approaches
to workplace regulation.20 5 Viewed in this way, wage law enforcement is
more than a discrete litigation objective-it is an element of the larger goal
of reforming the workplace.
203. Public interest lawyers have increasingly used employment law to combat injustice in the low-
wage workplace over the past ten years. See generally Rick McHugh, Recognizing Wage and Hour
Issues on Behalf of Low-Income Workers, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 289 (2001); Sharon Dietrich et al.,
An Employment Law Agenda: A Road Map for Legal Services Advocates, 33 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 541
(2000); Karl E. Klare, Toward New Strategies for Low-Wage Workers, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 245 (1995).
Today low-wage worker advocacy is central to public interest legal practice. Due to lack of resources
and the substantial set of legal needs, that practice could benefit from the expansion of class action
litigation aimed at enforcement of employment laws.
204. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 14, at 442; Sachs, supra note 164, at 2687.
205. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 14, at 442; Sachs, supra note 164, at 2687.
